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Abstract
This dissertation examines the determinants of local economic and political development in
India. In the first chapter, I study the impact that agricultural income shocks have on the
local nonfarm economy. I find that positive rainfall shocks induce significant employment
growth, not in the rural areas where agricultural production takes place but in the nearby
towns. Manufacturing firms in particular respond to changes in agricultural production.
Further investigation suggests that the most likely mechanism is a capital channel by
which local agricultural surplus funds investments in urban manufacturing. In the second
chapter, I examine the relationship between natural resource wealth and political outcomes.
The interaction of mineral deposit locations and global price changes provide exogenous
variation in the value of mineral wealth of state legislative assembly constituencies in India. I
find that margins of victory, incumbency advantages and politician criminality are increasing
in local mineral wealth. I test three channels for the criminality effect: (i) greater criminality
in office; (ii) adverse selection of politicians into the political system; and (iii) greater success
of criminal candidates in elections, finding the strongest evidence for the third effect. Finally,
in the third chapter, I evaluate the importance of transportation costs to rural economic
development. I take advantage of the allocation rules of a large-scale road construction
program in India to estimate the impact of village roads on nonfarm economic activity. I
find that new paved roads lead to large increases in village employment. Roads lead to
an increase in firm size, suggesting that firms are inefficiently small when transport costs
are high. Further, I find evidence that roads are most effective in the presence of electricity,
suggesting complementarities between infrastructural investments.
iii
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Chapter 1
The Impact of Agricultural Output on
Local Economic Activity1
1.1 Introduction
What consequences do sector-specific shocks have on other local economic activity? In
a highly integrated world, with few barriers to the reallocation of resources, the answer
should be little to none. Of course, the world is still characterized by limited mobility in
many goods, both intermediate and final. These frictions apply both to productive inputs,
such as labor (Behrman, 1999), capital (Banerjee, 2003; La Porta et al., 2002) and information
(Jensen, 2007), as well as in output markets (Limao and Venables, 2001; Donaldson, 2012).
A large “big push” literature shows how the decisions of firms can depend on the choices
of other local firms (see, for example, Murphy et al. (1989)). Immobilities increase these
interdependencies, meaning that the location decisions of firms will be determined more by
the availability of inputs and local demand in low-income countries than in richer nations
(Venables, 2005).
In this paper, we test for the impact of short-term agricultural output shocks on nearby
firms in unrelated sectors in India. We utilize exogenous variation in agricultural output due
to weather to estimate the dependence of firms on the local rural economy. In constrast to
1Co-authored with Paul Novosad.
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recent work on the United States (Hornbeck and Keskin, 2012), we find that strong evidence
that agricultural shocks have large and persistent consequences for local firms, particularly
manufacturing firms in nearby urban areas.
We consider India to be an optimal setting for this research. By taking advantage of
within-country variation in agricultural output, we are able to eliminate immobilities of
goods and labor that exist at national borders. Furthermore, India is a large developing
country with many of the constraints faced by other low-income countries. Finally, India
is a large country with considerable heterogeneity in local economic conditions, such as
infrastruture and industrial composition, that allow us to determine the characteristics of
industries and locations that make shocks more or less important for local economic activity.
We provide evidence to differentiate between two major channels by which agricultural
shocks may induce growth in nearby firms. In the first, local demand is increasing in
agricultural income, inducing employment growth in nearby firms producing imperfectably
tradable goods. This channel was explored at length by Mian and Sufi (2012), among
others, who argue that increases in local unemployment in the United States following the
financial crisis in 2008 were closely tied to shocks to household balance sheets and demand.
Our findings support a somewhat different story. We find that increases in agricultural
output cause significant employment growth in urban manufacturing firms, more than in
nontradable industries such as retail or other services. We argue that this is evidence for
immobilities in either inputs or outputs. A local demand channel does not fit our findings
well: areas wtih low transportation costs exhibit weakly greater growth in manufacturing
compared to areas where transportation costs are greater. If manufacturing employment
were growing in response to increases in local demand, we would expect to see the greatest
response to agricultural income in locations with high transportation costs. Instead, a capital
channel best explains our results. A positive shock to agriculture causes an increase in
employment in firms reporting a reliance on local, informal capital. This is consistent with
recent evidence suggesting that local sources of savings matter even for financial access in
the United States (Gilje, 2012), although credit constraints are widely considered to be more
2
binding in developing countries. Reasons for this include contracting (Banerjee, 2003) and
political interference (La Porta et al., 2002).2
Our findings support an intermediate level of localization of capital markets. Specifically,
we reject both autarky and perfect mobility of goods. Changes to manufacturing employment
in local urban areas suggest that capital flows occur between them and the rural areas in
which agricultural shocks occur. This finding implies that it is essential to consider nearby
urban areas when assessing the impact of agricultural performance on the non-farm economy
and structural transformation, in contrast to the rural focus of much of the literature (Foster
and Rosenzweig, 2004; Haggblade et al., 2010; Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2001).
Finally, we contribute to a large literature on the role of agriculture in development.
We provide evidence that weather shocks promote structural transformation: the number
of workers in agriculture decreases following positive rainfall shocks. However, we find
no evidence of permanent migration. Theoretically, the impact of shifts in agricultural
output on the nonfarm economy are unclear: on the one hand, increases may stimulate
demand, provide capital for investment and supply inputs to the non-agricultural economy.
On the other hand, increased agricultural productivity increases the returns to labor and
capital in agriculture, potentially crowding out other activities. Empirical evidence reflects
this ambiguity. Some researchers have found that agricultural productivity gains facilitate
economic growth and development (Gollin et al., 2002; Nunn and Qian, 2011), while others
have found that they crowd out non-agricultural activities (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2004).3
We should be clear that our shocks are best understood as windfalls, rather than the
permanent shifts in agricultural productivity typically discussed in the literature. More
closely related to this paper, and consistent with our results, Dercon (2004) provides
evidence that temporary rainfall shocks can produce persistent differences in consumption
2Burgess and Pande (2005) find significant decreases in rural poverty as the result of a major banking
expansion in India.
3For a comprehensive survey of the theory and evidence, see Douglas Gollin’s chapter in the Handbook
of Agricultural Economics (Gollin, 2010). For a more policy-focused survey, see the 2008 World Development
Report: Agriculture for Development (World Bank, 2008).
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in Ethiopian villages.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 develops a theoretical framework to or-
ganize our examination of the relationship between agricultural productivity shocks and
employment in the nonfarm economy. Section 1.3 explains the various sources of data
used and how the key variables are constructed. Section 1.4 lays out the empirical strategy
that is used to identify the impact of agricultural income on nonfarm employment, also
providing summary statistics of the main variables. Section 1.5 presents the primary results.
Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical framework
In this section we develop a theoretical framework for understanding how temporary shocks
to agricultural productivity will affect firms in the non-farm economy. The purpose is to
demonstrate how, depending on mobility of inputs and output, agricultural productivity
shocks can either crowd-out or crowd-in employment and production in nonfarm sectors.
Section 1.2.1 sets up the model, Section 1.2.2 derives the predictions that we will explore
empirically and Section 1.2.3 discusses the implications.
1.2.1 Setup
Consider a small open economy (say, a village) with two productive sectors: agriculture and
other. Each sector is modeled as a single, profit-maximizing firm. Agricultural production
utilizes only labor, such that the equation representing agricultural profits is the following:
ΠA = θln(LA)− wLA,
where θ > 0 is stochastic and represents temporary weather-related agricultural productivity
shocks.
Production of the other sector, which we call tradable, is CRS Cobb-Douglas in capital
4
and labor, such that tradable profits are represented by the following equation:
ΠT = AK
α
TL
1−α
T ,
where capital share α ∈ (0, 1) with permanent TFP parameter A.4
Agents are modeled as a single unitary household with Cobb-Douglas preferences over
consumption of agricultural and tradable goods:
U(CA,CT) = C
γ
TC
1−γ
A ,
ensuring that that expenditure on consumption of tradables pTCT is a constant share γ of
total consumption C. The price of agricultural goods is the numeraire, yielding:
CA = (1− γ)C.
For simplicity, intertemporal allocation of consumption is decided by a fixed savings
rate s, meaning that current consumption is a fixed proportion of current income:
Ct = (1− s)It.
Income not saved is added to the local capital stock K, producing the following equation of
motion for capital:
Kt = sIt−1 + Kt−1.
Labor is immobile across space, but not across sectors. The total labor supply available
in the village is normalized to 1; therefore LA + LT = 1. Given labor mobility across sectors,
the wage w must be equal in agriculture and the tradable sector.
We consider two market frictions that determine how shocks to the agricultural sector
4We model the economy with two sectors, although the analysis remains fundamentally similar if a third,
nontradable sector is included in the analysis. Instead, in modeling transport costs, we are able to consider how
the effect of temporary agricultural productivity shocks varies based on the tradability of the sector.
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will affect the nonfarm economy. The first, transport costs, are modeled as iceberg costs
τ ≥ 1: for one unit exported to the outside market, 1τ arrives at its destination. For simplicity,
these transport costs apply only to the non-agricultural good, although applying them to
agriculture does not fundamentally change the analysis. The price of the traded good in the
outside market is pT. Outside firms are indifferent between selling locally or to the outside
market, thus fixing the local price of the tradable good at τpT. Likewise, local producers
selling to the outside market face an effective price of
pT
τ .
Transport costs for capital, long a concern for development economists (Besley, 1995),
are the other friction. These create a wedge between the local and outside opportunity cost
of capital. As with τ above, φ ≥ 1 represents the cost of moving one unit of capital into or
out of the local market. The interest rate r in the outside market applies to both savings and
borrowing. Thus the cost of capital faced by firms borrowing locally is rφ , while the cost of
capital borrowed from the outside market is φr.
Frictionless markets in capital and tradable goods is achieved by setting τ = φ = 1. For
τ or φ greater than one, there is a wedge between the inside and outside prices of goods
and capital, changing the impact that agricultural productivity shocks have on the tradable
sector.
1.2.2 Production maximization problem
Solution of the model hinges on the source of marginal demand and marginal capital for
the tradable industry. Due to the transport costs of tradable goods τ, the firm will first sell
tradable goods to local market at τpT. Only once local demand is fully satisfied will the firm
sell to the outside market at effective price
pT
τ . Likewise, due to capital transport costs φ, the
firm will first rent local capital at rφ before renting outside capital at interest rate φr. Thus
there are four scenarios that determine equilibrium production and the relationship between
production in the two sectors. In the first, marginal production is sold to the outside market
at the lower effective price
pT
τ and marginal capital is borrowed at the higher rental rate
φr. In the second, marginal demand for tradable goods is still from the outside market,
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but marginal capital is rented locally. In the third scenario, the opposite is true: marginal
demand is local while marginal capital comes from the outside market. Finally, the fourth
scenario is de factor autarky: no tradable goods are sold to the outside market, nor is capital
borrowed from the outside.
Regardless of the which scenario the economy is in, profit maximization in the agri-
cultural sector yields L∗A =
θ
w∗ ; combined with the time budget constraint, we get LT =
1− LA = 1−
θ
w∗ . Thus it is easy to see the first effect that transitory shocks have on nonfarm
employment: in the absence of other forces, a high realization of θ will raise demand for
labor in the agricultural sector, crowding out employment and production in the tradable
sector.
Outside demand, outside capital
In the benchmark case, the tradable firm sells its production both locally and to the outside
market, as well as using capital sourced locally and from the outside. As prices for its output
are higher locally, it fulfills all local demand before selling remaining output to the external
market. As the rental rate of capital is lower internally, the firm rents the full local capital
stock K before renting additional capital from the outside market. The relevant prices that
determine the scale of production are the price faced at the margin,
pT
τ , and the rental rate
of capital faced at the margin, φr.
Given CRS production in the tradable sector, zero marginal profits fix the only equilib-
rium wage for which there will be positive sales to the outside market:
w∗ = (1− α)(
pTA
τ
)
1
1−α (
α
rφ
)
α
1−α .
The time budget constraints produces a solution for employment in the tradable sector:
LT = 1− LA = 1−
θ
w∗
. (1.1)
It should be noted that transport costs in both the goods and capital markets depress
the wage, leading to higher employment in agriculture and lower in the tradable sector.
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How does employment in the tradable sector respond to agricultural productivity shocks?
Differentiating Equation 1.1 by θ yields:
∂LT
∂θ
=
−1
1− α
(
τ
pTA
)
1
1−α (
rφ
α
)
α
1−α < 0.
Thus in our benchmark case, a high realization of θ unequivocally crowds out employ-
ment in the tradable sector. Both goods and capital transport costs amplify the crowd-out.
The case of frictionless markets, with τ = φ = 1, is a particular example of this scenario,
which leads to the following proposition:
Employment in the tradable sector is strictly decreasing in θ under either of the following
conditions:
• Frictionless markets, defined as iceberg costs of goods (τ) and of capital (φ) both equal
to 1.
• The firm sells positive output to the outside market and borrows positive capital from
outside lenders.
Outside demand, local capital
In this scenario, the tradable sector still sells a positive amount of output to the outside
market after meeting all local demand; however, it now finds itself credit constrained. At the
local capital rental price, it demands more capital than the local capital stock (K∗T(
r
φ ) > K),
but it is not profitable for the firm to borrow capital from the outside market (K∗T(φr) = 0).
5 The firm thus chooses LT subject to KT = K. This maximization yields:
L∗T = K
( (1− α)ApT
w∗τ
) 1
α ,
5In fact, another scenario is possible where the firm uses only local capital but does not find itself credit
constrained. This is when the level of capital demanded at the local rental rate of rφ is less than the local capital
stock K. This scenario becomes the same as in Section 1.2.2, but where the rental rate φr is replaced with rφ .
8
where w∗ satisfies the following equality:
1 =
θ
w∗
+ K
( (1− α)ApT
w∗τ
) 1
α .
It is easy to see that even with capital constraints, tradable employment and production
is crowded out by high realizations of agricultural productivity, which pushes up the wage.
Because the tradable sector is dependent on local capital, however, its scale of production is
increasing in K, which is itself increasing in past realizations of θ. We thus have under this
scenario that current agricultural productivity crowds out tradable production, while past
agricultural productivity crowds in tradable production.6
Local demand, outside capital
In this scenario, the tradable sector meets local demand but finds it unprofitable to export
to the outside market. It does, however, borrow capital from the outside market. In this
equilibrium, it minimizes costs subject to meeting local demand CT. This leads to the
following employment in the tradable sector:
L∗T = K
( (1− α)ApT
w∗τ
) 1
α ,
where w∗ solves the following equality, coming from the fixed supply of labor:
1 =
θ
w∗
+ K
( (1− α)ApT
wτ
) 1
α .
Current agricultural productivity has countervailing effects on employment in the
tradable sector. On the one hand, it lowers tradable employment by increasing returns
to labor in agriculture and the equilibrium wage; on the other hand, it increases income
and thus local demand for tradable goods. The total effect is ambiguous. Past agricultural
6In fact, the capital stock has countervailing effects on tradable employment. Higher local capital stock
increases returns to labor in the tradable sector, increasing employment. However, it also increases the wage,
lowering tradable employment. By differentiating the household time budget constraint with respect to the
capital stock, it is easy to show that the former effect is strictly greater.
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productivity has an unequivocal positive effect on tradable production by increasing the
capital stock and thus current income. This scenario is characterized by a demand constraint
on tradable production, leading to an increase in tradable production and labor.
Local demand, local capital
In the final scenario, the tradable sector neither sells to the outside market nor does it borrow
capital from the outside market. There are actually three possibilities here. In the first, the
firm demands less capital than is available at the local rental price φr and produces less
than is demanded at the local price
pT
τ . This case is equivalent to Section 1.2.2 but where
the relevant prices are φr and
pT
τ . We know from Section 1.2.2 that in this case, tradable
employment and production are decreasing in agricultural productivity. In the second
possibility, the firm is not constrained by local demand but is constrained by local capital K
and finds it unprofitable to sell to the outside market; this is analogous to Section 1.2.2 but
with marginal revenue τpT. In the third possibility, the firm is constrained by local demand
but not by the local supply of capital; this is analogous to Section 1.2.2 but with marginal
price of capital rφ .
Finally, the firm may be constrained by both demand and capital, without finding it
worthwhile to produce for the outside market or borrow additional capital. In this case, the
firm simply employs enough labor to meet local production:
L∗T = (
CT
AK
α )
1
1−α .
The wage is then set to satisfy the time budget constraint. Employment in the tradable sector
is increasing in agricultural productivity via demand for tradable goods. Past agricultural
productivity, however, produces competing effects through its impact on the capital stock.
A greater capital stock increases capital earnings and thus demand for tradable goods.
However, it also crowds out demand for labor, as labor in the tradable sector will only be
sufficient to meet local demand in this scenario.
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1.2.3 Discussion
In the absence of market frictions that limit the mobility of inputs to or outputs from the
non-agricultural sector, positive agricultural shocks crowd-out production and employment
by increasing competition for common inputs. Even in the presence of frictions in input and
output markets, crowd-out may still occur if the marginal source of either inputs or demand
comes from outside the local area and is thus independent of local agricultural productivity
shocks, such that an increase in agricultural labor demand reduces the use of labor in the
tradable sector.
However, for any firms that on the margin depend on local inputs or demand, such
shocks can crowd-in rather than crowd-out non-farm economic activity. In the model
presented above, costs associated with the movement of inputs and outputs play analogous
roles. This is due to the dual effects of agricultural productivity shocks: they affect demand
via earnings and capital supply via savings.
In order to test between these channels, it is necessary to identify the determinants
of these frictions. Firms will be more likely to depend on local marginal demand in the
presence of high transportation costs. These costs may result from characteristics of the
industry, such as a high weight-to-value ratio, or of the location, such as low quality road
infrastructure. Costs associated with outside borrowing, on the other hand, will depend on
the availability of financial services and the credit intensity of an industry. These location
and establishment characteristics will provide the basis for the empirical tests discussed in
the following sections.
For the interpretation of the results presented in this paper, it is necessary to consider
how transitory output shocks differ from the long-term growth in agricultural productivity
more often considered in the literature. There are two primary differences. The first is that
in terms of permanent income, a one or even five year period of good rain is much smaller
than a permanent increase in agricultural productivity of the same annual magnitude.
Second, weather-induced output shocks should not change expectations of long-run income.
How do these differences matter in the framework discussed above? A permanent shift
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in agricultural productivity would lead to a permanent shift in local demand, leading to a
level expansion in the size of the tradable sector so long as marginal demand is local. A
temporary shock, on the other hand, will in the absence of market frictions lead to a much
smaller increase in the long-run size of the nontradable sector, as demand in the long-run
will depend only on the portion of the shock that was saved and continues to provide income
to households many years after the shock. In a standard dynamic savings model, current
consumption should not increase much as expectations over lifetime earnings will have
changed only slightly. Thus, short-term shocks should result in larger changes to savings
and smaller changes to consumption than equivalent changes in long-term agricultural
productivity.
1.3 Data and construction of variables
1.3.1 Data
In order to examine the relationship between agricultural production and business activity,
it was necessary to link datasets containing information on firms, location characteristics,
agricultural production, land use, irrigation status and weather.
The Indian Economic Census is a comprehensive enumeration of all firms not engaged
in crop production, both formal and informal. We use firm-level data from the 3rd, 4th and
5th rounds, undertaken respectively in 1990, 1998 and 2005.7 The Economic Census contains
a small number of characteristics about each firm, including the number of employees and
some of their characteristics, the firm’s source of power, details about the firm’s registration,
and the industrial code of the primary product.8
The Indian Population Census provides village and town demographic data in 1991 and
7These data are publicly available from the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI),
but are not organized as a panel. With the assistance of location keys from MoSPI, we constructed panels at the
village, town, district and subdistrict levels, then linking them to population census identifiers.
8It is worth noting that this includes privately owned establishments, state-owned establishments and
government establishments like schools and health centers.
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2001, as well as local public goods (roads, electricity, schools and hospitals), distances from
villages to major towns, and land area. We obtained geographic coordinates for population
census locations from ML Infomap and matched them to weather data (described below)
and to bounding polygons of administrative units. All population and economic census
data was then aggregated to 1991 Population Census subdistrict level for rural areas and
the district level for both urban and rural areas. For all results coming from the Economic
Census, we measure employment growth as change in employment from 1990-98 and
1998-2005.
Agricultural data comes from a variety of sources. District-level data on area, production
and prices by crop, 1990-2005, comes from the Center for the Monitoring of the Indian
Economy and from the Indian Ministry of Agriculture. Subdistrict-level cropping patterns
and irrigation data come from the Indian Agricultural Census of 1995, 2000, and 2005.9 The
Population Census also provides area under cultivation, by irrigation status, in 1991 and
2001.
Weather data for 1971-2005 comes from the Indian Meteorological Department’s National
Climate Centre (Rajeevan and Bhate, 2008; Srivastava et al., 2009). This dataset uses daily
recordings from 6076 (rainfall) and 395 (temperature) weather stations to produce a 0.5◦ x
0.5◦ grid. We then interpolate weather values to match the geographic units used in our
analysis. For subdistricts and districts, we obtain weather values using an average of village
values weighted by agricultural land.
Industry measures come from a variety of sources, summarized by Table 1.7. Following
Moretti (2010), we classify as tradable all industrial sectors that fall under the manufacturing
header (Section D) of the 2004 National Industrial Classification of India. We use a cross
section of the Indian Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) from 1991-1992 to generate two
industry-level measures, both scaled to be between 0 and 1.10 First, we calculate capital
intensity as the ratio of gross fixed capital to labor costs. Second, we calculate reliance on
9Data was scraped in the spring of 2012 from dacnet.nic.in.
10This was the earliest year available to us that fell in the period for which we have outcome data (1990-2005).
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external finance as the ratio of open loans to gross fixed capital. This second measure is
in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998), whose measure is highly correlated with our
own but limited to just 19 industries that we are able to match with the Indian National
Industrial Classification (NIC). For tradability, we match commodity-level data from the
United States Census Commodity Flow Survey (CFS) of 2007 to NIC codes, providing a
measure for each industry of the average shipping distance of its major commodity, a direct
measure of the transportability of goods given high quality of infrastructure, as found in
the United States. Our location-level measure of transportation costs estimates the cost of
shipping goods on the Indian highway network. Using both the data and methodology of
Lall et al. (2004), we estimate transportation costs from the district centroid to the nearest
city with a population of at least 500,000, according to the 2001 Population Census. We
consider this a much stronger measure of the relevant transportation costs in a given area
than widely used alternatives, particularly the quality of rural roads, since the transport
costs that will determine whether demand for tradable goods in urban areas is met by local
or outside firms is the cost of moving goods in and out of the district, not from the local
town to the agricultural areas.11
The Input-Output Tables produced by MoSPI provide industry measures of input
intensity: the share of an industry’s non-labor input costs that come from a particular sector
of the economy. For example, we construct a measure of agricultural input share, defined as
the share of input costs derived from non-timber agricultural inputs. We use the input flow
matrix from the 2006-7 update to the 2004-5 Input-Output Tables.
1.3.2 Construction of variables
Table 1.1 summarizes the construction of the main variables used in this paper. We construct
panels (district and subdistrict) with two periods as defined by the three economic censuses.
Period 0 corresponds to 1990 - 1998, while period 1 corresponds to 1998 - 2005. For
11We thank Henry Jewell and Hyoung Gun Wang, of the World Bank Urban Unit, for generously generating
and sharing these data.
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growth regressions, baseline employment is given by 1990 employment in period 0 and 1998
employment in period 2. Agricultural income is summed over the five years preceding the
end of the period: 1993-1997 for period 0 and 2000-2004 for period 1.
Following Cole et al. (2012) and consistent with various studies on Indian agriculture
(Fishman, 2011; Guiteras, 2009), the primary climactic variable of interest is rainfall during
the summer monsoon, defined as total precipitation over the months of June, July, August
and September. This period roughly corresponds to the kharif (summer) growing season,
although rabi (winter) crops also depend heavily on summer rain (citation). We demean
and normalize rainfall values to produce a measure of rainfall that is exogenous to local
characteristics. Although agricultural productivity is usually increasing in rainfall, there
is the possiblity for too much rain. Like other recent papers (Cole et al., 2012; Hidalgo et
al., 2010), we account for this non-montonic relationship between rainfall and agricultural
output by defining our rain variable as the absolute value of the difference (in standard
deviations) between observed rain and optimal rain for agricultural income, which our
calculations suggest is 1.25 standard deviations above mean. As with agricultural income,
we sum annual rainfall over the five year period preceding the Economic Census.
Working over a 15 year time period poses challenges towards the creation of a panel, as
administrative units can change both name and area. In order to form a panel of districts,
it was necessary to account for district splits and other redistributions of land between
districts. We use Kumar and Somanathan (2009), as well as data provided by the Ministry
of Statistics and Programme Implementation, to construct a panel of consistent districts
over time. This involved agglomerating some districts into larger “super districts” when
territorial transfers made districts inconsistent over time. From a total of 593 districts at the
time of the 2001 Population Census, we construct a panel of 414 consistent districts and
“super districts”. Of these, we are able to match 388 across all datasets. Dropping small
states and union territories reduces this number to 353. Finally, we restrict our sample to
those districts in which agriculture is a major industry, keeping only districts that have more
than 50% of the population living in rural areas. Missing data and trimming outliers results
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Table 1.1: Construction of Primary Variables
Variable Source Description
Employment Economic Census Sum of employment of all nonfarm economic establishments in the Economic
Census for each round (1990, 1998, 2005), including private firms, state-owned
firms and government establishments (e.g. public schools).
Firm Count Economic Census Count of number of nonfarm economic establishments in the Economic
Census for each round (1990, 1998, 2005), as defined above.
Rain Indian Meteorological
Department & ML In-
fomap
Demeaned and normalized measure of summer monsoon rain, defined as
rain during the months of June, July, August and September. We match all
villages to latitude and longitude using ML Infomap GIS data. We interpolate
rainfall from grid points to the full village dataset of the 2001 Population
Census. Subdistrict and district rainfall values are then computed as mean
village rainfall, weighted by land under cultivation as given in the 2001
Population Census.
Agricultural
income
Ministry of Agriculture
& CMIE Indian Harvest
Sum of price × production for major crops at the district level, as reported by
the Indian Ministry of Agriculture and compiled by the authors and CMIE.
Missing prices are assigned using average state price for that year where
available and average national price otherwise.
Infrastructure Population Census The village and town tables of the Indian Population Census (1991, 2001)
provide measures of infrastructure (road, electricity, etc.).
Irrigation share Agricultural & Popula-
tion Censuses
The proportion of irrigated to non-irrigated land comes primarily from
the Agricultural Census of 1995. Where missing it is provided first by the
Agricultural Census of 2000 and if still missing from the 1991 Population
Census. This proportion is then multiplied by land under cultivation as
reported by the Indian Ministry of Agriculture and CMIE to get annual
district-level land by irrigation status.
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in 526 district-period observations in the two period panel.
1.4 Empirical strategy
]
This section describes the empirical strategy used to estimate the linkages between
agricultural output and nonfarm economic activity. As discussed above, weather provides
exogenous variation in agricultural output that will be used to estimate the causal impact of
agricultural income on nonfarm economic activity.
Let i = 1, ...,N index districts and τ = 1, ..., T0(1990), ..., T1(1998), ..., T(2005) index years.
Time periods are indexed using t, which consist of the years between observations of
variables; for example, t = 1, 2 correspond to the Economic Census periods 1990-1998
and 1998-2005, respectively. The outcome variable of interest is represented by Yi,τ, which
in our case is log employment growth. The endogenous variable, agricultural income, is
represented by Xi,τ. X˜i,τ is the k× 1 vector of other explanatory variables and Zi,τ is the
p × 1 vector of excluded instruments. For simplicity, we sometimes use the (p + k)× 1
vector Wi,τ = (Z
′
i,τ, X˜
′
i,τ)
′.
The structural equations for our model are:
Yi,τ = βXi,τ + δ
′X˜i,τ + ǫi,τ (1.2)
and
Xi,τ = γ
′Zi,τ + λ
′X˜i,τ + νi,τ, (1.3)
which produce the reduced form equation
Yi,τ = β(γ
′Zi,τ) + (δ + βλ)
′X˜i,τ + ui,τ (1.4)
where ui,τ = ǫi,τ + βνi,τ.
To go from the model above to the data that we will use, it is necessary to sum
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up from years (τ) to periods (t) that correspond to the Economic Census; for example,
Yi,t=1 = ∑
T1
τ=T0
Yi,τ and Yi,t=2 = ∑
T
τ=T1
Yi,τ.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Agricultural income
As the identification strategy of this paper relies on the impact of weather on agricultural
income, it is first worthwhile to investigate this relationship. Table 1.2 estimates the impact
of rainfall on total crop income at the district level. Column 1 gives the impact of rain
on annual district agricultural income, measured in standard deviations from the mean.
Column 2 shows that this relationship is not monotonic. Column 3 uses the preferred
specification for the rest of the paper, following (Cole et al., 2012), which is rain measured in
standard deviations from the district optimum, which we estimate as 1.25 SD above mean.
We estimate that an additional standard deviation of rain towards the optimum results in
approximately 637 million rupees, or approximately $14.5 million.
1.5.2 Reduced form
Table 1.3 uses the same functional form to estimate the reduced form relationship between
rain and nonfarm employment growth in rural areas, now controlling for baseline employ-
ment as well. There is no significant relationship between rural employment growth and
rainfall. Column 1 regresses log employment growth on the sum of rainfall in the five
years preceding the economic census. Table 1.4 repeats the exercise, dividing employment
into nontradables and tradables, with tradable industries defined as all those in Section D
(Manufacturing) of the Indian National Industrial Classification. Again, we see no signifi-
cant relationship between rainfall and employment growth. In contrast, Table 1.5 reveals
that urban employment in strongly increasing in rainfall. There does not appear to be an
immediate effect; instead, employment growth appears to be increasing as the time between
the agricultural income shock and the period of observation occurs. Table 1.6 divides this
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Table 1.2: Effect of rainfall shocks on district agricultural income
(annual, 1999-2004)
1 2 3
Rain 5607.739 5933.648
(1115.639)*** (1116.941)***
Rain2 -3261.392
(857.973)***
Rain AV125 6365.839
(1248.261)***
District FE Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
N 1524 1524 1524
r2 0.99 0.99 0.99
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is annual district agricultural income, as reported
by the Planning Commission. Rain is defined as standard deviations from mean rainfall, with mean and
standard deviations defined at the district level using the panel 1971-2005. Rain AV125 is defined as the absolute
deviations from 1.25 standard deviations above mean, multiplied by -1 in order to make agricultural income
increasing in the variable. All regressions have district and state-year fixed effects, with robust standard errors
clustered at the district level.
growth into nontradable and tradable industries; here we find significantly higher growth
in manufacturing industries.
1.5.3 Channels
The results presented in Section 1.5.2 make clear that employment in urban manufacturing
is strongly increasing in rainfall; one standard deviation increase in rainfall in one of the
years preceding the economic census produces approximately 3.4 log points of additional
employment growth. As discussed in Section 1.2, tradable employment would only respond
to local income in the presence of some frictions in local input or output markets; we
therefore take this result to demonstrate the presence of such frictions. These could take a
number of forms. In the presence of immobile labor, we would expect to see crowd-out of
tradable production, as increased returns to labor in agriculture increase wages that tradable
goods producers must pay. This is the opposite of what we find. Instead, this result is more
consistent with distance-related costs in either capital or output.
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Table 1.3: Effect of rainfall on rural employment growth
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Rain (sum) 0.004
(0.010)
Raint−1 0.016 0.016
(0.016) (0.013)
Raint−2 0.002 0.000
(0.030) (0.028)
Raint−3 0.005 0.007
(0.029) (0.027)
Raint−4 -0.031 -0.037
(0.019) (0.021)*
Raint−5 0.036 0.043
(0.034) (0.034)
N 526 526 526 526 526 526 526
r2 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.39
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is rural district nonfarm employment growth, in logs. All regressions with state-year fixed effects and
robust standard errors, clustered at the state level. Rain is defined as -1 × the absolute value of standard deviations of rainfall minus 1.25, considered the
optimal amount of rainfall. Rain (sum) is summed over the five year period before the Economic Census. Period 0 thus corresponds to the five year window
1993-1997 and period 1 to 2000-2004. Raint−n is rainfall n years before the end of the Economic Census period. Control variables for all regressions are period
land, urban and rural population, and share of employment in banking in 1990.
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Table 1.4: Effect of rainfall on rural manufacturing employment growth
NT NT T T
Rain (sum) 0.002 0.007
(0.008) (0.015)
Raint−1 0.020 0.016
(0.016) (0.018)
Raint−2 0.001 0.004
(0.029) (0.043)
Raint−3 0.012 0.007
(0.023) (0.052)
Raint−4 -0.046 -0.026
(0.026)* (0.019)
Raint−5 0.039 0.041
(0.037) (0.039)
N 526 526 526 526
r2 0.44 0.45 0.31 0.31
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is rural district employment growth, in logs. Tradable
employment (columns 3 and 4) is defined as employment in all establishments in the Economic Census with
NIC codes falling under Section D (Manufacturing). Non-tradable employment (columns 1 and 2) is the sum
of employment in all economic establishments not classified as manufacturing enterprises. All regressions
with state-year fixed effects and robust standard errors, clustered at the state level. Rain is defined as -1 × the
absolute value of standard deviations of rainfall minus 1.25, considered the optimal amount of rainfall. Rain
(sum) is summed over the five year period before the Economic Census. Period 0 thus corresponds to the five
year window 1993-1997 and period 1 to 2000-2004. Raint−n is rainfall n years before the end of the Economic
Census period. Control variables for all regressions are period, land, urban and rural population, and share of
employment in banking in 1990.
The most plausible story not explored in the model presented in Section 1.2 is that
growth is driven by industries that rely on large quantities of agricultural inputs. It is
natural to imagine that brewers and millers will thrive during agricultural booms, simply
because of cheaper or more abundant inputs. We examine this by constructing a measure of
agricultural input intensity: the share of non-labor input costs derived from agricultural
goods, as described in Table 1.7. We construct a dummy variable for any industry that
spends more than 20% of its non-labor input costs on agricultural products. Table 1.8
shows that in no specification do industries that are intensive in agricultural inputs respond
21
Table 1.5: Effect of rainfall on urban employment growth
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Rain (sum) 0.017
(0.006)***
Raint−1 -0.003 -0.003
(0.018) (0.018)
Raint−2 0.039 0.032
(0.024) (0.024)
Raint−3 0.046 0.040
(0.014)*** (0.012)***
Raint−4 -0.007 -0.011
(0.021) (0.020)
Raint−5 0.034 0.038
(0.011)*** (0.012)***
N 526 526 526 526 526 526 526
r2 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is urban district nonfarm employment growth, in logs. All regressions with state-year fixed effects and
robust standard errors, clustered at the state level. Rain is defined as -1 × the absolute value of standard deviations of rainfall minus 1.25, considered the
optimal amount of rainfall. Rain (sum) is summed over the five year period before the Economic Census. Period 0 thus corresponds to the five year window
1993-1997 and period 1 to 2000-2004. Raint−n is rainfall n years before the end of the Economic Census period. Control variables for all regressions are period,
land, urban and rural population, and share of employment in banking in 1990.
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Table 1.6: Effect of rainfall on urban manufacturing employment growth
NT NT T T
Rain (sum) 0.010 0.034
(0.005)* (0.013)**
Raint−1 0.002 -0.015
(0.017) (0.033)
Raint−2 0.019 0.079
(0.023) (0.028)**
Raint−3 0.028 0.075
(0.017) (0.029)**
Raint−4 -0.011 -0.020
(0.017) (0.026)
Raint−5 0.022 0.070
(0.016) (0.024)***
N 526 526 526 526
r2 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.40
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is urban district employment growth, in logs. Tradable
employment (columns 3 and 4) is defined as employment in all establishments in the Economic Census with
NIC codes falling under Section D (Manufacturing). Non-tradable employment (columns 1 and 2) is the sum
of employment in all economic establishments not classified as manufacturing enterprises. All regressions
with state-year fixed effects and robust standard errors, clustered at the state level. Rain is defined as -1 ×
the absolute value of standard deviations of rainfall minus 1.25, considered the optimal amount of rainfall.
Rain (sum) is summed over the five year period before the end of the Economic Census period. Period 0 thus
corresponds to the five year window 1993-1997 and period 1 to 2000-2004. Raint−n is rainfall n years before
the end of the Economic Census period. Control variables for all regressions are period, land, urban and rural
population, and share of employment in banking in 1990.
significantly more to rainfall shocks than other industries.12
Another potential explanation is that industries themselves may depend directly on
water, in which case the identifying assumptions discuss in Section 1.4 are violated. We
consider this unlikely. Only one industry in the input-output tables spends more than
1% of its non-labor input costs on water: water-based transport. Even manufactures of
non-alcoholic beverages spend just over 1/10 of 1% of its non-labor inputs costs on water.
If the local availability of investment capital is an increasing function of local savings,
12We do find less statistically significant coefficients on Rain than in the main reduced form specification, but
this is unsurprising given that we are not able to match all industries in the Economic Census to the industries
in the input-output tables.
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Table 1.7: Construction of Location and Industry Characteristics
Variable Source Description
Location classifications
Bank90 Economic Census
(1990)
Share of workers in location employed in the banking sector.
Market access World Bank Transportation costs from district centroid to nearest city of greater than
500,000 population in 2001 Population Census, as calculated using the Indian
road network in Lall et al. (2004).
Industry classifications
Tradable & Non-
tradable
National Industrial
Classification (2004)
Following Moretti (2010), we define tradable industries as all those falling
under the manufacturing header (Section D)
Capital Intensity Annual Survey of In-
dustries (1991-2)
Total productive capital stock / total annual labor costs
External finance
dependency
Annual Survey of In-
dustries (1991-2)
Open loans / productive capital stock. Our best approximation of the measure
used in Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Input Spending
Shares
Input-Output Table
(MoSPI)
Using the 2006-7 update to the 2004-5 Input Flow Matrix, we assign each
industryi-industryj pair an input share based on the percentage of non-labor
and non-within-industry expenditure that industryi spends on inputs from
industryj. We then aggregate these for each industry based on the input of
interest. For example, agricultural share is the by-industry share of input
costs that go to agricultural products.
Tradability (CFS) Commodity Flow Sur-
vey
The US Census Commodity Flow Survey gives average distance traveled per
shipment by industry, which are then matched to NIC codes. Higher values
mean more tradadable goods.
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Table 1.8: Impact of rainfall on employment growth by agricultural input intensity
Rural Rural Urban Urban
Rain (Sum) 0.005 0.018 0.018 0.020
(0.012) (0.016) (0.007)** (0.007)**
High -0.189 -0.356 -0.474 -0.505
(0.078)** (0.194)* (0.068)*** (0.096)***
Rain × High -0.025 -0.005
(0.022) (0.010)
N 1062 1062 1058 1058
r2 0.92 0.92 0.96 0.96
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is urban district nonfarm employment growth, in logs.
All regressions with state-year fixed effects and robust standard errors, clustered at the state level. Rain is
defined as -1 × the absolute value of standard deviations of rainfall minus 1.25, considered the optimal amount
of rainfall, summed over the five year period before the end of the Economic Census period. Period 0 thus
corresponds to the five year window 1993-1997 and period 1 to 2000-2004. High is a binary variable representing
industries with agricultural input share of weakly greater than 0.2, determined using input-output tables.
Control variables for all regressions are period, land, urban and rural population, and share of employment
in banking in 1990. The coefficient on Rain therefore captures the effect of rainfall on employment growth in
industries with agricultural input shares less than 0.2.
then tradable firms meeting external demand would expand in response to a positive shock
to agricultural income. Table 1.9 provides some suggestive evidence for the existence of
such a localization of capital markets, examining the share of firms reporting using local
finance, as opposed to formal finance. We show that rainfall shocks increase the share of
firms reporting use of local finance.
What about demand? There is certainly strong reason to believe that increased demand
due to higher incomes from agricultural windfalls leads to employment growth: most of
the employment response of the nonfarm economy is in the nontradable sector. Table 1.10
explores this channel further by categorizing districts as above or below median in road
infrastructure, an important determinant of transport costs and thus tradability. We find no
evidence for an increase in urban manufacturing employment in those districts that have
higher transportation costs; the point estimate on the difference is actually negative, the
opposite of what we would expect under scenario where urban manufacturing firms meet
local demand.
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Table 1.9: Effect of rainfall on share of firms reporting informal financing
Employment Firm Count
Rain (sum) 0.005 0.005
(0.002)** (0.003)
Pop urban share -0.085 -0.113
(0.046)* (0.056)*
Bank emp share 0.002 -0.003
(0.012) (0.010)
N 263 263
r2 0.43 0.60
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is change in share of establishments in the Economic
Census reporting informal finance, 1998-2005. Firms receiving informal finance are those not reporting bank or
government finance as the primary source of finance. All regressions with robust standard errors and state-year
fixed effects, clustered at the state level. Rain is defined as -1 × the absolute value of standard deviations of
rainfall minus 1.25, considered the optimal amount of rainfall, summed over the five year period before the end
of the Economic Census period. Period 0 thus corresponds to the five year window 1993-1997 and period 1
to 2000-2004. Control variables for all regressions are period, land, urban and rural population, and share of
employment in banking in 1990.
1.6 Conclusion and next steps
How do frictions in markets in developing countries affect the spatial distribution of eco-
nomic activity? Does agricultural income continue to play an important role in determining
the economic opportunities of urban firms, or do global capital and goods markets make
local income irrelevant? We provide new evidence on these classic questions in development
economics. We find that positive shocks to rural agricultural income induce employment
growth in urban areas, with growth concentrated in the manufacturing sector. In testing
between demand and capital channels that could explain such manufacturing growth, our
evidence suggests that agricultural surplus increases growth in manufacturing firms by
providing capital, suggesting both that such firms are capital constrained and that local
informal capital markets can successfully intermediate between local rural surplus and
urban investment opportunities.
Given these findings, it is necessary for economists to move beyond their focus on the
relationship between agriculture and the rural non-farm economy. It should be of little
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Table 1.10: Effect of rainfall on manufacturing growth by market access
Low Trans Costs High Trans Costs Pooled
Rain (sum) 0.044 0.025 0.046
(0.013)*** (0.023) (0.012)***
Rain * High TC -0.026
(0.016)
High TC -0.215
(0.128)
N 245 277 522
r2 0.47 0.38 0.39
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is urban district employment growth in manufacturing
establishments, in logs. All regressions with robust standard errors and state-year fixed effects, clustered at the
state level. Rain is defined as -1 × the absolute value of standard deviations of rainfall minus 1.25, considered
the optimal amount of rainfall, summed over the five year period before the end of the Economic Census period.
Period 0 thus corresponds to the five year window 1993-1997 and period 1 to 2000-2004. High TC is a variable
representing above median transportation costs from the district to the nearest city of 500,000 people (2001).
Control variables for all regressions are period, land, urban and rural population, and share of employment in
banking in 1990.
surprise to development economists that the performance of urban economies is linked to
that of nearby rural areas. Migration, consumption and capital flows are but three examples
of the linkages between urban and rural economies.
These findings have implications for many debates in development policy. First, policies
that increase agricultural production may also contribute to industrialization, although we
must be cautious when applying findings from shocks to long term changes in productivity.
Second, other policies that increase rural income, such as the Mahatma Gandhi National
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), may also increase industrialization. It
should be noted that the increase in manufacturing employment that we observe occurs
entirely in urban areas. This suggests that although manufacturing firms in rural areas
may be credit constrained, returns in urban areas appear sufficiently high to overcome the
proximity that rural firms have to the source of the income shock. Differences between
returns to rural and urban manufacturing are certainly a topic for further inquiry.
Finally, our findings suggest that informal networks are able to intermediate capital
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between agricultural earnings and investment opportunities in manufacturing. Further
research is needed to understand the channels by which agricultural surplus can fund
urban manufacturing growth and the reasons that capital is able move from rural to urban
areas within a district but is sufficiently localized to produce local growth, rather than
being invested nationally. Although informal markets appear to successfully facilitate
manufacturing growth, it is necessary to understand the efficiency with which they are able
to fund entrepreneurship in order to judge how well they can substitute for formal financial
institutions.
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Chapter 2
Natural Resource Wealth and Local
Politics1
2.1 Introduction
At least as far back as Thomas Malthus, economists have been concerned with the role of
natural resources in economic development. Sachs and Warner (1995) launched a modern
literature into the issue, demonstrating that natural resource wealth was correlated across
countries with underdevelopment. That natural resource dependence often coexists with
poor governance is widely known; however, we are still far from understanding the channels
by which mineral wealth could undermine institutional quality, and the conditions under
which this occurs. As pointed out by Isham et al. (2005), while Chad and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo may suffer from clear curses of natural resources, the United States
and Norway provide equally strong examples of countries with long and consistent growth
records whose institutions were not undermined by vast natural resource wealth.
Natural resources do not appear at random, and they tend to be fixed over time, making
inference about their effects difficult. Places rich in natural resources may lack other natural
advantages; for example, they may be mountainous or remote. Counterfactual stories for
places rich in natural resources are inherently challenging to defend. Rather than attempt
1Co-authored with Paul Novosad.
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the very difficult task of constructing a counterfactual political environment for a resource
rich location, this paper compares natural resource rich locations with each other over time.
We use price shocks to provide plausibly exogenous variation to the value of subsurface
natural resources in a given location. The context is India, a nation which as a whole is not
highly dependent on point-source natural resources2, but has many regions which produce
a wide range of natural resources, including coal, iron, gold and various other minerals.
This provides an ideal context for examining the impact of mineral wealth on political
outcomes. First, by using subnational and subregional variation, we are able to compare
outcomes in regions that share basic political institutions. Second, by interacting global prices
changes with the presence of mineral deposits, we generate plausibly exogenous variation
in the value of subsoil mineral resources. India contains considerable internal variation in
mineral deposits but overall production is small relative to world totals (Indian Bureau of
Mines, 2011), eliminating the possibility of reverse causality from local political outcomes
to global mineral prices. Third, Indian law defines the national and state governments to
be claimants of all mineral taxes and royalties. We are therefore able to rule out one of
the primary mechanisms by which natural resources are thought to undermine political
outcomes: significant increases in local government revenue.
The starting point for this paper is the observation that changes in natural resource
wealth influence political outcomes through many, often highly tangled and overlapping,
channels. We propose and test three mechanisms by which mineral wealth may influence
political outcomes. First, the selection effect posits that greater mineral wealth will change
the composition of the candidate pool in local elections. Second, the election effect suggests
that conditional on the candidate pool, mineral wealth changes the likelihood of electoral
victory of certain types of candidates. Third, in the moral hazard effect politicians change
their behavior in office in response to changes in the value of subsoil resources. We find
strongest evidence for the election effect: winning candidates are much more likely than
other candidates to have criminal cases against them. Our incumbency results also suggest
2We exclude agriculture from this study.
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that the probability of victory for certain types of candidates is increasing in mineral wealth.
At this point we cannot identify the underlying mechanism for these results. As will be
discussed later in this paper, potential candidate and party responses to mineral wealth
prevent us from attributing such results to changes in voter behavior alone.
This paper provides some of the first microeconomic causal evidence of a direct effect of
natural resource wealth on local political outcomes. When a region experiences a boom in
the value of subsurface natural resources, politician criminality increases significantly. In
particular, we find that winning candidates are significantly more likely to be implicated
in criminal cases. Margins of victory increase and incumbents are more entrenched: the
vote share of both local incumbents and the state ruling coalition is increasing in the global
prices of local mineral deposits. Thanks to the exceptional nature of Indian laws regarding
mineral royalties, we are able to provide what we believe to be the first evidence of political
consequences of natural resource wealth in the absence of significant changes to local
revenue.
Despite competitive elections, criminality is common among politicians in democracies
around the world. This is particularly true in developing countries, with potentially large
negative consequences for welfare (Chemin, 2012). Postulated reasons for such a prevalence
of criminals range from the advantage of criminals in intimidating voters (Aidt et al., 2011)
to a lack of political competition (Banerjee et al., 2012a). Our findings, while not conclusive,
point away from a lack of choice: winners are more likely to be criminal than the rest of the
field of candidates. In subsequent sections we discuss some of the reasons why criminals
may have electoral advantages in the presence of high mineral wealth.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the existing literature
examining the linkages between natural resources and political outcomes. Section 2.3 gives
background information on mining in India and Indian political organization. Section 2.4
describes the sources of data and the construction of variables. Section 2.5 presents the
3Such electoral advantages may include greater appeal to voters, but not necessarily. For example, criminal
politicians may exert greater effort to win elections if they are then better able to capture rents once in office.
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conceptual framework that guides our empirical investigation. Section 2.6 explains our
empirical strategy. Section 2.7 presents and discusses the results. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Literature
There is a large if inconclusive literature seeking to understand the effects of natural resource
wealth on political outcomes.This literature may be divided into two broad categories:
conflict and democratization.4
The last ten years have seen numerous papers utilizing natural experiments to provide
variation in income generally and natural resource wealth specifically, primarily at the
country level, to understand the determinants of conflict. Miguel et al. (2004) use weather
shocks to find that economic growth in Africa strongly reduces the likelihood of civil
conflict. Bruckner and Ciccone (2010) find similar results using fluctuations in the prices
of export commodities in sub-Saharan Africa, perhaps the closest existing paper to ours
methodologically. Other papers find the opposite effect. Angrist and Kugler (2008) use
within country variation in coca suitability to study the effect of a large increase in the
demand for coca, finding an increase in conflict as groups fought over the rents in the
coca trade. Still other studies find that resource wealth, once other variables are properly
controlled for, has no impact on conflict or the overthrow of governments (Bazzi and
Blattman, 2011). Cotet and Tsui (2013) use new oil discoveries to provide exogenous
variation in resource wealth, also finding no significant effect on conflict. Dube and Vargas
(2012) attempt to rationalize these disparate findings, arguing that resource production may
increase conflict over government revenues but also decrease conflict through increasing the
opportunity cost of time. They find evidence for this by comparing the differential effects of
oil and coffee price shocks in Colombia; positive shocks to oil, a capital-intensive commodity,
result in increases in conflict, while positive shocks to coffee, a labor intensive commodity,
have the opposite effect.
4These are neither perfectly distinct nor comprehensive. Democratization often occurs as the result of armed
conflict, and institutional quality involves many components beyond democratic depth.
32
The literature on democratization and institutional quality has likewise focused on
natural resources and political outcomes at the country level, with different studies finding
positive, negative and insignificant associations. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) find that
after properly controlling for other factors, natural resource endowments are positively
associated with institutional quality. Likewise, Bruckner et al. (2012) find that increases in
the international price of oil are actually associated with positive changes in the democracy
scores of and democratic transitions in oil exporters. Brollo et al. (2013) find that increases
in government revenues both attract lower quality politicians and induce politicians in
office to be more corrupt. Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) find that natural resources only
increase corruption in places that have been nondemocratic for most of the years since 1956.
Burke and Leigh (2010) find evidence for heterogeneous effects depending on the type of
resource; negative agricultural shocks (droughts) cause increases in democratization, while
mineral price shocks have little to no effect. They take their findings to be supportive of
the theory of Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) that democratization occurs when pressure is
brought on governments by non-elites; agricultural production shocks create mass pressure
for democratization specifically, while price drops in point-source commodities would not,
although they would put fiscal pressure on governments highly dependent on natural
resource royalties for government revenue. Our results contribute to this literature on
democratization, not on the extensive margin but on the consolidation of democracy and
determinants of institutional quality. An increase in the criminality of those holding political
power is likely to weaken rule of law, as recent evidence from India seems to suggest
(Chemin, 2012).
Ross (2001) proposes three channels by which point-source resource abundance may
harm the quality of democratic institutions: a “rentier effect” in which resource wealth
allows governments to avoid accountability; a “repression effect” in which resource wealth
funds costly political repression; and a “modernization effect” in which resource wealth
causes growth without the social and cultural change required for effective democratic
governance. This paper seeks to contribute to our understanding of this “rentier effect”,
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which is the result of multiple channels beyond a simple increase to government revenue.
Changes to natural resource wealth are changes to the rents available to politicians, which
Fisman et al. (2013) show to be significant in India. The availability of rents influences both
who enters politics and their behavior in office, what Brollo et al. (2013) refer to as the
selection and moral hazard effects of changes in government resources.
Yet political rents are not simply a function of government revenue. Certainly point-
source natural resource extraction is often an important source of government revenue.
But it is also an industry whose characteristics facilitate political rent seeking (Isham et
al., 2005). First, firms are generally large, making political rent extraction easier. Second,
mineral extraction involves high up front fixed costs followed by marginal costs that are
often well below market prices, creating large profits for politicians to tax. Third, mining
is a government-input intensive industry: governments often have rights to the land on
which mining takes place, leases, permits and licenses (e.g. environmental clearances) are
allocated at the discretion of government agencies, and mineral extraction is intensive in
government-provided infrastructural inputs such as roads, water and electricity. All of
these characteristics make mineral extraction an attractive target for rent-seeking politicians,
particularly in developing countries where there are weak institutional constraints on elected
officials.
It is generally difficult to disentangle the political impact of mineral wealth’s revenue
effect from other rent seeking discussed above, as mining almost always makes important
contributions to government revenue, particularly at the national level. Brollo et al. (2013)
make some progress on this front by taking advantage of exogenous variation in government
revenues unrelated to natural resource extraction. Our work is complementary to theirs,
isolating instead the non-revenue impact of mineral wealth. Indian mineral policy directs
all taxes and royalties on mineral extraction to the national and state governments, with no
provision for redistribution of such revenue back to the source locations. This grants us the
unique opportunity to examine the other means by which natural resources can influence
political outcomes.
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Recent work in economics and political science has attempted to explain the prevalence
of criminal politicians, with a particular focus on India. Chemin (2012) deepens the puzzle
by finding that representation by criminal politicians is associated with a significant decrease
in the living standards of minorities, which he suggests is the result of an increase in crime
and corruption. Aidt et al. (2011) find that political parties choose more criminal candidates
when literacy levels are low and electoral outcomes are uncertain, which they interpret
as evidence for the ability of criminal politicians to intimidate voters.5 Banerjee et al.
(2012a) conduct a voter information experiment in Uttar Pradesh, finding that improved
information about candidates lowers support for criminal candidates and that support
for criminal candidates does not covary with educational or ethnic status. They conclude
that such results are not consistent with a theory of voter preferences for criminality, but
rather imperfect information or a lack of alternatives. Our findings suggest a somewhat
different story. We find significantly larger effects of mineral wealth on the criminality
of winners than on the criminality of the candidate pool as a whole. This suggests that
criminal politicians are more likely to win election in response to an increase in mineral
wealth. While we may only speculate as to why this is, our findings are not consistent with
the theory that voters have no choice over criminality. As we discuss in more detail below,
there are various reasons why voters may prefer criminal politicians during periods of high
mineral prices.
2.3 Mining and politics in India
2.3.1 The mineral industry in India
Although modern India is not normally associated with great mineral wealth, it does in
fact contain a large and varied natural resource sector. In 2010, the mining sector employed
521,000 workers and produced 2.5% of Indian GDP (Indian Bureau of Mines, 2011). Since
5See Vaishnav (2012) for further discussion of why parties may prefer to field criminal politicians under
certain circumstances.
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natural resources are not found in all locations, the share of output of the natural resource
sector in the areas of its occurrence are much larger. Over sixty different major minerals are
mined in approximately 3000 mines (Tata Environmental Research Institute, 2002).6
Historically, Indian mines were predominantly state owned until significant privatization
in the 1990s. In 2010, 2229 of 2999 mines were private, representing 36% of total production
value (Indian Bureau of Mines, 2011). Significant minerals deposits are found in nearly
every region and state of India. The major exception is the region known as the Deccan
Traps, a large flood basalt (lava flow) that covers a vast region in western-central India.
The mining sector is jointly regulated by the federal and state governments. Notably,
royalties and taxes paid by mining corporations are paid directly to state and federal
governments. Importantly for this study, there is no requirement for fiscal proceeds
from mining to be spent in communities affected by mines, nor any evidence that these
communities have any entitlement to such funds.
2.3.2 Political context
India is a federal parliamentary democracy. Representatives for the lower house of par-
liament, the Lok Sabha, are elected in first past the post, single elector constituencies.
Members of the state legislative assemblies (MLAs), the focus of this paper, are elected in
the same fashion. State governments are generally ruled by a chief minister, the leader of
the ruling party or coalition in the state legislative assembly. State government ministers
are drawn from the ranks of MLAs in the ruling party or coalition. The responsibility of
MLAs is primarily to vote in the state legislative assembly, although they do have other
more executive powers in their local areas (e.g. personal development funds) as well as
considerable informal authority. Importantly, politicians also have some control over bureau-
cratic assignments, enabling them to exert influence over policymaking and implementation
formally assigned to the bureaucracy (Iyer and Mani, 2012).
6Major minerals such as iron ore are jointly regulated by the national and state governments, while minor
minerals such as granite are regulated entirely by state governments.
36
Electoral boundaries are set by a Delimitation Commission. Although such a commission
is supposed to redraw all boundaries every ten years following the completion of the
decennial population census, boundaries were frozen between 1976 and 2007. Thus, in the
period covered by our analysis, only one redistricting took place; elections taking place
during or after 2008 follow the new constituency boundaries.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Sources
Data on electoral outcomes comes from the Election Commission of India (ECI).7 This dataset
contains candidate-level information on every candidate competing in state legislative
assembly elections, including name, gender, party and votes received. Constituency level
data on total electors and turnout is also available. We constructed our own dataset of
state assembly governing coalitions going back to 1976, which we use to measure ruling
coalition performance. Where possible we used official election commission and other state
government documents to construct coalitions, augmenting them with newspaper accounts
where necessary.
Data on politician characteristics comes from sworn affidavits submitted by candidates to
the ECI. The Indian Supreme Court declared in rulings in 2002 and 2003, that all candidates
must submit criminal, financial and educational information in order to be eligible for office.
Politicians may be penalized for inaccuracies with fines, imprisonment and disqualification.
By 2004, such requirements were in place in all states. The Association for Democratic
Reform, a Delhi-based non-governmental organization, has collected, digitized and made
publicly available these data.8 Financial information contained in these affidavits includes
7While these data are publicly available in pdf format on the ECI website, we thank Francesca Jensenius
for generously sharing her cleaned data files. See Jensenius (2013) for a more detailed description of Indian
electoral data.
8http://adrindia.org/about-adr/who-we-are
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Map of all major mineral deposits in India, as listed by the Mineral Atlas of India (Geological Survey of
India, 2001). This includes deposits not used in this paper, for reasons discussed in Section 2.4.4. Nearly all
states have major mineral deposits. The major exceptions are in the Indo-Gangetic Plain (Punjab, Uttar Pradesh)
and in the northeast of India (Mizoram, Tripura).
Figure 2.1: Map of deposit locations
own assets and liabilities, as well as those of spouses and family members.9 Politicians are
also required to report any open criminal cases in which they are a defendant. Election laws
in India bar convicted criminals of contesting elections; thus, pending criminal cases are the
best available measure of politician criminality.10
Data on the location, type and size of mineral deposits come from the Mineral Atlas
of India (Geological Survey of India, 2001), whose appendix contains the following data
for major mineral deposit in India: centroid latitude and longitude, mineral type, and size
class. Figure 2.1 shows a map of mineral deposit locations. Commodity prices come from
the United States Geological Survey (Kelly and Matos, 2013), to our knowledge the most
complete set of historical commodity prices available. All prices are for average prices in
the United States for a given year. Where available, we use the price for the ore as it is listed
in the Indian deposit data. Where not, we match deposits to the price of the processed
output of the mineral deposit (e.g. aluminum for bauxite). Finally, the geographic data
necessary for matching electoral constituencies to mineral deposits comes from the ML
Infomap Pollmap dataset, which contains digitized GIS data based on maps published by
the Election Commission of India.
The unit of observation for this paper is the constituency-year. Whenever data is available
at the candidate level (e.g. candidate wealth), we collapse individual candidate level data to
constituency-year averages.
9Although private financial information is difficult to verify, other researchers have also found this data
reliable enough to work with. For example, Fisman et al. (2013) use affidavit data to estimate the private returns
to holding political office.
10One potential concern is that spurious criminal charges may be made against certain candidates by others
in an attempt to reduce competition. While this is possible, candidates are only required to report cases that a
judge has decided warrants judicial proceeding upon presentation of evidence by police and prosecutors.
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2.4.2 Definition of variables
Dependent variables
For each outcome derived from candidate affidavits, we create two variables, one for the
winner and one for the average of the candidate pool (winner included). This allows us to
differentiate between effects driven by candidate entry and those driven by voter choice, as
discussed in Section 2.5. In this way we create variables for candidate assets, criminality
and education. Candidate assets are defined as the sum of personal and family assets. We
construct three measures of the criminality of political candidates. First, the binary variable
Criminal indicates whether any criminal cases are being brought against a candidate at the
the time of the election. Second, Criminal Count is an integer containing the number of
criminal cases being brought against a candidate. Finally, the Association for Democratic
Reform provides data on serious criminal cases such as murder and rape. We thus create
the binary variable Serious Criminal to indicate whether a candidate is charged with any
serious criminal cases. Finally, for education we create the variable Graduate to indicate
whether a candidate has graduated from secondary school.
We likewise aggregate data from the Election Commission of India to the constituency-
year level. We construct two measures of political competition: number of candidates
contesting the election (top coded at 30) and effective number of parties (ENOP, an inverse
Herfindahl measure of inequality of votes widely used in political science since its introduc-
tion by Laakso and Taagepera (1979)). We then define a series of variables measuring ex
post political competitiveness. Turnout, the share of eligible voters casting votes, is taken
directly from ECI reports. Margin is defined as the vote share of the winner minus the
vote share of the runner up. Local Inc Margin is defined as the vote share of the party
incumbent in the constituency minus the largest vote share of the non-incumbent party
candidate. State Inc Margin is the same measure but for the ruling coalition: the top placing
incumbent state coalition vote getter minus the top placing candidate from a party not in
the ruling coalition. Positive values of Local Inc Margin and State Inc Margin indicate that
the incumbent (party in the constituency or state coalition) is the winner. We thus define
39
Local Inc Win and State Inc Win as binary variables indicating that Local Inc Margin and
State Inc Margin are greater than zero, respectively.
Price shocks
As discussed by Van der Ploeg (2011), natural resource dependence is likely to be endoge-
nous to the quality of political institutions, a challenge to researchers who wish to identify
the causal impact of mineral wealth on political outcomes. We address this concern by
developing a measure that combines the location of mineral deposits with movements in
the global price of the commodity. Our approach is closest to that of Bruckner and Ciccone
(2010), who use price movements of international commodities to estimate the impact of
economic shocks on civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. They construct the commodity price
index for a given country in a given year as the weighted average of the price indexes of the
various export commodities, with weights assigned by export share. We interact mineral
price indexes with the presence of mineral deposits. From a list of 45 minerals for which we
have both deposit and price data, we discard economically unimportant minerals, defined
as those for which the Indian Bureau of Mines does not publish production statistics or
those whose average output per deposit is valued at less than 1 million INR in 2009, the
most recent year for which we have reliable disaggregated data.11 We thus end up with
1325 deposits of 27 distinct minerals spread across 25 states in India. It is worth noting
that we use the presence of deposits instead of the presence of mines, as the existence of
deposits cannot be the outcome of political processes, while mines require not only deposits
but also political inputs such as infrastructure, clearances and capital. As discussed by
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), among others, common measures of resource abundance,
such as share of GDP from primary commodities, are in fact correlated with institutional
factors and are better described as measures of resource dependence. Our use of mineral
deposits avoids this endogeneity.
11We also discard fuel mineral (coal, lignite, oil and natural gas) producing regions, which account for 70%
of the mineral production in India and are highly spatially concentrated (Indian Bureau of Mines, 2011). Their
inclusion makes less tenable our assertion that price movements are uncorrelated with location characteristics.
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Map of all state legislative constituencies in India (1976-2007 delimitation). Constituencies are shaded according
to mean mineral price shock, as defined in Section 2.4.2. Red constituencies received above median price shocks
in example year 2005, while blue constituencies received below average price shocks. White constituencies are
those excluded from our sample, either because they had no major mineral deposits within 25 km or because
they were within 25 km of a coal deposit. Definition of sample is discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.4.
Figure 2.2: Map of price shocks (2005)
We then assign deposits to state legislative constituencies by calculating the distance
between deposit and constituency boundary. We consider a deposit to be linked to a
constituency if the distance between deposit centroid and constituency boundary is less than
25 km. There are multiple reasons to believe deposits that do not fall within constituency
boundaries will still affect political outcomes. First, deposits may be large geographically,
but our data gives only the coordinate of the deposit centroid; thus a nearby constituency
may actually contain mines from a deposit outside of its boundaries. Second, mines outside
of a constituency may still be political linked to a constituency; for example, if a mine
requires that a road be built through a neighboring constituency, it is likely to seek the
support of the local MLA. Figure 2.2 is a map of constituencies, shaded according to their
price shocks in 2005.
We then generate a constituency-year price shock using international price data from the
United States Geological Survey. As legislative assembly terms are generally five years long,
we calculate the price index for commodity c in year t as the average price in years t− 5
through t− 1, scaling by the average price in years t− 15 through t− 6. Mathematically:
PriceShockc,t =
∑
t−1
τ=t−5 pricec,τ
∑
t−6
τ=t−16 pricec,τ
Figure 2.3 presents mineral-wise price shocks for sample year 2005. We use a five year
numerator and a ten year denominator in order to create a reliable price index that is not
overly driven by large but transitory swings in the price of the commodity. In order to
assign a single price shock to a constituency that could have multiple deposits, we follow
Bruckner and Ciccone (2010) in averaging the price indexes, weighting by the number of
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Figure 2.3: Mineral price shocks 2000-2005
Bar graph of price shocks by mineral in 2005. All 25 minerals used in this paper are displayed.
deposits of each mineral type assigned to the constituency.
2.4.3 Control variables
We use a range of constituency-level variables to control for constituency characteristics
that may condition the political environment. We calculate the number of deposits and
number of large deposits within 25km of a constituency as described in the preceding
section. We then use our geospatial merge of constituencies and census locations (villages
and towns) to generate two classes of controls. The first set of controls seeks to control for
basic constituency characteristics that may affect the degree of political competition and
types of politicians that compete for office. These are log population, share of population
that lives in rural areas (villages), share of the population that is employed outside of basic
crop production and average firm size. The first two come from the 2001 Population Census.
The latter two, which we use as proxies for the economic development in a constituency,
come from the 2005 Economic Census.12 The second set of controls are proxies for the
size and competence of government in the constituency: share of villages with electricity,
primary schools per capita and government share of nonfarm employment. The first two of
these variables are drawn from the 2001 Population Census, while the third comes from the
2005 Economic Census.
2.4.4 Construction of sample
Before the redistricting of 2007, there were 4090 constituencies in the states of India.13. We
eliminates states that lack major mineral deposits, leaving 3733 constituencies in 24 states.
12See Asher and Novosad (2013) for a detailed description of this dataset.
13Union territories are governed differently and generally do not have legislative assemblies
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Much of the empirical work in this paper, however, utilizes variation in mineral prices to
provide exogenous variation in the value of mineral wealth. This analysis is conducted with
the 1324 remaining constituencies that are matched to mineral deposits. For the analysis
restricted to large deposits, this number shrinks to 1053 unique constituencies.14
2.5 Conceptual framework
The theoretical approach of this paper begins with the career concerns model of Brollo et
al. (2013), itself based on earlier work by Persson and Tabellini (2000). They advance our
understanding of the political consequences of increases in government revenue by distin-
guishing between two effects, what they call selection and moral hazard. The selection effect
comes from the attraction of low quality candidates to an increase in political rents, while
the moral hazard effect is an increase in corruption due to an increase in the incumbent’s
probability of reelection. We argue that there are, in fact, three channels by which a natural
resource boom may affect the characteristics and behavior of politicians. The selection effect
is actually comprised of two, potentially competing, effects. The true selection effect comes
from different potential candidates deciding to run. The election effect, in contrast, comes
from the collective decision of the voters of whom to elect to office. Finally, once in office,
there is a potential change of officeholder behavior in response to a natural resource boom.
Theoretically, the impact of a mining boom on both the selection and election effects is
unclear. Brollo et al. (2013) assume that political rents are more valuable to lower quality
politicians, thus predicting (and finding) that an increase in government revenue would lead
to a decrease in politician quality. This is not, however, obvious. It is possible that rents are
more valuable to criminal politicians, who are experts in illicit gain, but it is also possible
that political rents are most valuable to well educated politicians who can successfully
control a larger bureaucracy or set of projects.
On the election effect, the literature provides little guidance as to how voter preferences
14Large deposits are defined as type I and II deposits according to Geological Survey of India (2001), the size
of which varies by mineral.
43
over candidate characteristics might change in response to changes in the value of mineral
wealth. Robinson et al. (2006) explicitly model the effect of natural resource price changes
on development via politician behavior, but by assuming voter policy preferences are
independent of mineral prices, they do not consider how preferences over politicians may
respond to price changes. Focusing on criminality, voters may prefer less criminal politicians
to manage a resource boom because they are less likely to divert needed investments for
their own gain; on the hand, voters may prefer a more criminal politician with a higher
ability to get fast results out of India’s notoriously slow and corrupt bureaucracy, thus
increasing the local economic benefits of a price increase. This is complicated by yet another
determinant of electoral outcomes: campaign spending. Sadly, it is beyond the scope of
this paper to investigate the response of campaign spending to resource booms. Although
the affidavit data does include campaign spending by candidate, we consider it to be of
very low quality. Kapur and Vaishnav (2011) discuss how extremely low limits on campaign
spending results in a very high level of “black” (unreported) money in Indian elections.
Official, self-reported campaign spending is thus of little value to researchers. Finally, parties
themselves may choose to field different candidates in response to a mining boom.
2.6 Empirical strategy
In this section we explain the two approaches that we use to analyze the effect of natural
resource wealth on political outcomes.
2.6.1 Cross-section OLS
In line with much of the literature on natural resources, we begin with the OLS comparison of
resource-rich regions to non-resource rich regions, controlling for observable characteristics.
This cross-sectional comparison shows how regions with natural resource wealth compare
with regions without natural resource wealth.
We use geological deposits as the explanatory variable rather than quantity of natural
resources exported or mining sector jobs because the latter may be endogenously determined
44
by other factors. For example, endemic corruption in a region could mitigate the rise of a
secondary sector, causing natural resource exports to dominate a local economy even if they
do not cause political corruption. Geological deposits are a superior measure as they are an
unchanging characteristic of a region.15
The empirical specification is:
Yi = β0 + β1 ∗ Depositi + β2 ∗ X
′
i + γs,t + ǫi, (2.1)
where Depositi is a dummy variable indicating existence of a mineral deposit, or a deposit
above a certain size threshold, Xi is a vector of controls and γs,t represents state-year fixed
effects. The sample is the entire set of Indian legislative constituencies for which we have
data, as discussed in Section 2.4.4. In all specifications we present heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors, clustered at the state level.
2.6.2 Price shocks
The problem with the OLS specification is that places with large mineral deposits may
differ in unobservable ways from places without deposits. If towns were founded with the
objective of exploiting natural resource deposits, they may lack other natural advantages,
such as accessibility to major urban centers or pre-existing public goods. Mineral deposits
are often found in rural, underdeveloped areas where political variables such as competition
and corruption may differ significantly from more developed parts of the country. Of
equal concern, mineral deposits can only be discovered in places where firms have made
investments in exploration; such willingness to invest is likely to be endogenous to location
characteristics.
To address these problems, we limit the sample to locations with natural resource
deposits, and examine how political outcomes respond to the effect of recent commodity
15There is some possibility that discovery of deposits is a function of political conditions. This problem does
not persist when we move to the price shock specifications below.
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price shocks on political outcomes.16 We then run a panel regression of outcomes on trailing
5-year price shocks. We estimate the following equation at the constituency-year level:
Yi,t = β0 + β1 ∗ pshocki,t + ζ ∗ Xi,t−1 + γs,t + ǫi,t, (2.2)
where pshocki,t is the size-weighted price change of geological deposits in constituency i
in year t, X is a vector of constituency controls, and γs,t represents state-year fixed effects.
The coefficient β1 identifies the effect of a commodity price on the political outcome. As
we are using interacted state-year fixed effects, our estimates are the result of variation in
commodity price changes within a given state in a given election. In all regressions we
present heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the state level.
2.7 Results
2.7.1 Summary statistics
Table 2.7.1 gives summary statistics for our sample. Of the 4090 total state legislative
constituencies in India, there are on average approximately two deposits within 25km of a
constituency and approximately one large deposit per constituency. In the sample for which
we have affidavit data, nearly 22% of candidates have criminal cases pending against them;
this number exceeds 31% for winning candidates. Winning candidates are more likely to
have serious criminal cases against them (14% to 10%). Winning candidates also, on average,
have assets worth more than twice as much as the candidate pool as a whole. Our electoral
outcome sample is much larger, as it begins in 1980 rather than 2004 for the affidavit data.
Political competition is mixed: the mean margin of victory is nearly 14%, but turnout is
over 64% and nearly 9 candidates contest the mean election. In this sample, local incumbent
parties retain control of their constituencies in 46.7% of elections, while the incumbent ruling
coalition wins 48.7% of seats in the following election.
16At a global scale, India is not a large producer of any of these commodities, so we are not concerned about
endogeneity of prices.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N
Deposit count 2.227 (5.624) 4090
Large deposit count 1.039 (2.743) 4090
Pr(candidate criminal) 0.218 (0.245) 6294
Pr(winner criminal) 0.311 (0.463) 6294
Pr(candidate serious criminal) 0.098 (0.171) 6294
Pr(winner serious criminal) 0.143 (0.35) 6294
Criminal cases count (mean) 0.537 (0.996) 6294
Criminal cases count (winner) 0.932 (2.45) 6294
Candidate assets (million INR) 10.781 (31.023) 6294
Winner assets (million INR) 22.897 (78.829) 6294
Number of candidates 8.851 (6.01) 30962
Margin of victory 0.138 (0.126) 27810
Turnout 0.642 (0.143) 24666
Vote share incumbent party - vote share top opponent -0.016 (0.195) 14634
Local incumbent win 0.467 (0.499) 14634
Vote share previous coalition - vote share top opponent 0.003 (0.218) 13981
State incumbent win 0.487 (0.5) 13981
2.7.2 Cross-sectional analysis
We first seek to understand how areas rich in natural resources vary from those that do not have
natural resources. Table 2.2 shows that the candidate pool in areas with mineral deposits are
approximately 15 log points less wealthy than those in areas without mineral deposits. There are
not, however, significant differences in candidate criminality or education between constituencies
with and without mineral deposits. These findings hold for winning candidates as well (Table 2.3):
they are 11 log points less wealthy than winning candidates in other constituencies, but are not
significantly different in other features that we observe.
Electoral results demonstrate additional differences between areas having and lacking mineral
deposits. Table 2.4 presents results for the number of candidates running, effective number of parties
(ENOP, an inequality measure of vote shares across candidates), margin of victory and voter turnout.
We find that margins of victory are somewhat larger in places with mineral deposits, but we also
find that ENOP is weakly higher in constituencies with mineral deposits. Table 2.5 presents findings
on the performance of local and state incumbents. We find no no significant differences in incumbent
performance between constituencies with and without mineral deposits.
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Table 2.2: Cross sectional relationship between mean candidate characteristics and existence of mineral deposits
Criminal Serious Criminal Criminal Count Assets Graduate
Deposit -0.004 0.007 -0.018 -0.152 -0.003
(0.009) (0.006) (0.036) (0.038)*** (0.014)
Log population -0.001 -0.000 -0.008 -0.070 -0.002
(0.005) (0.003) (0.023) (0.029)** (0.006)
Rural pop share 0.003 -0.002 -0.006 0.016 -0.001
(0.010) (0.006) (0.049) (0.044) (0.011)
Employment share 0.003 -0.065 0.480 1.452 0.046
(0.046) (0.034)* (0.540) (0.489)*** (0.147)
Firm size -0.005 0.001 0.014 0.059 -0.012
(0.005) (0.003) (0.040) (0.053) (0.009)
Rural electrification -0.003 0.001 0.007 0.404 0.099
(0.023) (0.021) (0.076) (0.110)*** (0.037)**
Primary schools per capita -8.284 -2.750 -43.325 -81.313 -17.385
(6.120) (3.800) (26.072) (40.783)* (6.398)**
Government employment share -0.067 -0.021 -0.125 -0.578 0.164
(0.034)* (0.029) (0.169) (0.219)** (0.073)**
N 4983 4983 4983 4980 4943
r2 0.21 0.13 0.12 0.34 0.14
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The independent variable of interest, Deposit, is a binary variable indicating whether a constituency is within 25km of a
mineral deposit. The columns, in order, estimate the effect of price shocks on the share of candidates with any criminal cases pending, the share of candidates
with serious criminal cases pending, the mean number of criminal cases pending against candidates, the natural log of mean candidate assets and the share
of politicians who are secondary school graduates. All regressions include constituency-year fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust,
clustered at the state level.
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Table 2.3: Cross sectional relationship between winning candidate characteristics and existence of mineral deposits
Criminal Serious Criminal Criminal Count Assets Graduate
Deposit -0.002 0.008 -0.048 -0.121 -0.014
(0.013) (0.012) (0.064) (0.041)*** (0.018)
Log population 0.001 0.009 0.058 -0.056 -0.001
(0.008) (0.007) (0.043) (0.030)* (0.012)
Rural pop share 0.022 0.024 0.057 -0.037 -0.026
(0.021) (0.016) (0.112) (0.064) (0.017)
Employment share 0.077 -0.031 0.767 1.599 0.125
(0.142) (0.089) (1.161) (0.682)** (0.222)
Firm size -0.014 0.007 0.018 0.056 -0.046
(0.014) (0.008) (0.093) (0.048) (0.015)***
Rural electrification -0.000 -0.026 0.114 0.529 0.206
(0.031) (0.023) (0.113) (0.113)*** (0.062)***
Primary schools per capita -17.132 -5.639 -62.005 -63.330 -16.785
(11.948) (5.899) (40.730) (42.901) (10.850)
Government employment share -0.050 -0.059 -0.220 -0.678 0.178
(0.117) (0.071) (0.437) (0.288)** (0.082)**
N 4983 4983 4983 4911 4943
r2 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.27 0.05
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The independent variable of interest, Deposit, is a binary variable indicating whether a constituency is within 25km
of a mineral deposit. The columns, in order, estimate the effect of price shocks on the probability that the winning candidate has any criminal cases
pending, the probability that the winning candidate has serious criminal cases pending, the total number of criminal cases pending against the winning
candidate, the natural log of winning candidate assets and the probability that the winning candidate is a secondary school graduate. All regressions include
constituency-year fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at the state level.
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Table 2.4: Cross sectional relationship between electoral outcomes and existence of mineral deposits
Candidates ENOP Margin Turnout
Deposit -0.143 0.092 0.007 -0.010
(0.240) (0.052)* (0.004)* (0.005)*
Log population -0.423 0.009 -0.005 0.012
(0.088)*** (0.015) (0.002)** (0.004)**
Rural pop share -0.549 0.090 -0.005 0.018
(0.286)* (0.026)*** (0.003) (0.006)***
Employment share 7.385 -0.457 -0.036 -0.014
(1.745)*** (0.206)** (0.028) (0.038)
Firm size 0.153 -0.002 0.004 -0.008
(0.108) (0.010) (0.001)*** (0.003)**
Rural electrification 1.960 -0.282 0.012 0.022
(0.836)** (0.095)*** (0.012) (0.015)
Primary schools per capita -822.864 -17.657 5.657 10.214
(237.305)*** (20.803) (2.485)** (6.269)
Government employment share 0.073 -0.235 0.046 -0.153
(1.867) (0.227) (0.023)* (0.044)***
N 20035 22098 22490 20034
r2 0.59 0.38 0.15 0.68
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The independent variable of interest, Deposit, is a binary variable indicating
whether a constituency is within 25km of a mineral deposit. The columns, in order, estimate the effect of price
shocks on the total number of candidates running, the effective number of parties, the margin of victory and voter
turnout. All regressions include constituency-year fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust,
clustered at the state level.
2.7.3 Response to price shocks
In this section we present our findings of the effect in exogenous changes in the global price level of
locally produced minerals, as described in Section 2.6.2. We present our findings with a minimum of
interpretation; we discuss possible interpretations of these results in Section 2.7.4. In the discussion
below, point estimates represent the effect of an increase of 1 in the price shock variable, which is
equivalent to a constant, sustained 100% increase in the price level over the baseline price, or a 200%
linear increase in the price level over the 5 years prior to the election.
Table 2.6 presents the effect of price shocks on mean candidate criminality across a range of
specifications. We find that candidate criminality is weakly increasing in mineral prices, with
results stable across a range of specifications. In Table 2.7 we present the results of the same
specifications, with the dependent variable being winner criminality instead of mean candidate
criminality. Columns 1 through 3 present the results using our full sample of deposits. We find that
winners are approximately 10 percentage points more like to have criminal cases against them in
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Table 2.5: Cross sectional relationship between incumbent performance and existence of mineral deposits
Local Inc Margin Local Inc Win State Inc Margin State Inc Win
Deposit 0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.023
(0.007) (0.015) (0.005) (0.013)
Log population -0.005 -0.010 0.000 0.001
(0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.011)
Rural pop share -0.012 -0.019 0.000 0.007
(0.006)* (0.014) (0.005) (0.011)
Employment share -0.050 0.019 -0.100 -0.163
(0.068) (0.174) (0.040)** (0.094)*
Firm size 0.006 0.008 0.002 0.001
(0.003)** (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
Rural electrification 0.009 0.055 -0.012 -0.048
(0.027) (0.057) (0.019) (0.031)
Primary schools per capita 11.647 22.390 2.991 1.526
(7.760) (16.904) (7.867) (21.316)
Government employment share 0.000 0.040 -0.070 -0.150
(0.034) (0.071) (0.039)* (0.084)*
N 11802 11802 11619 11619
r2 0.16 0.13 0.36 0.28
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The independent variable of interest, Deposit, is a binary variable indicating
whether a constituency is within 25km of a mineral deposit. The columns, in order, estimate the effect of
price shocks on the margin of victory for the constituency incumbent party, probability of reelection of the
constituency incumbent party, the margin of victory of the state ruling coalition and the probability of victory
of the state ruling coalition. Margins of victory are defined as the vote share of the incumbent candidate minus
the vote share of the highest placing non incumbent candidate. All regressions include constituency-year fixed
effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at the state level.
constituencies that have experienced a price shock of 1. This result is stable to the introduction of
demographic controls (column 2) and controls proxying for the size and effectiveness of government.
Columns 4 through 6 present the same specifications but restricted to large deposits (dropping type
3 deposits, the smallest classification given by Geological Survey of India (2001)). We find similar
results: winning politicians are approximately 8.5 percentage points more likely to be criminal in the
presence of a positive price shock in the specification with full controls. All results are significant at
the 10% confidence level, with the specifications with full controls yielding coefficients on the price
shock variable significant at the 1% level.
For the remaining tables, we restrict ourselves to the specification with full controls and the
price shocks based on all deposits. Table 2.8 presents the effects of price shocks on mean candidate
characteristics, and Table 2.9 presents the same results for winning candidates only. For the most part
we do not find that price shocks predict significantly more criminal, wealthy or educated politicians;
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Table 2.6: Effect of price shocks on mean candidate criminality
1 2 3 4 5 6
Price shock 0.026 0.026 0.028
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Price shock (large deposits) 0.023 0.025 0.025
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Deposit count -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Large deposit count -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log population -0.015 -0.017 -0.018 -0.017
(0.009)* (0.009)* (0.010)* (0.010)*
Rural pop share 0.003 0.004 0.014 0.014
(0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019)
Employment share 0.087 0.044 0.121 0.056
(0.106) (0.118) (0.144) (0.166)
Firm size -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Rural electrification -0.035 -0.026
(0.052) (0.064)
Primary schools per capita -24.293 -25.889
(12.400)* (16.305)
Government employment share -0.064 -0.099
(0.073) (0.084)
N 1812 1755 1755 1453 1408 1408
r2 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.25
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions include constituency-year fixed effects. The sample for columns 1 through 3 is all constituencies within
25km of mineral deposits, while columns 4 through 6 exclude constituencies that are within 25km of only the smallest category of deposits (type 3). Columns
2 and 5 introduce demographic constituency-level controls. Columns 3 and 6 use the full set of demographic and political controls. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at the state level.
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Table 2.7: Effect of price shocks on winning candidate criminality
1 2 3 4 5 6
Price shock 0.094 0.099 0.101
(0.037)** (0.036)** (0.035)***
Price shock (large deposits) 0.079 0.085 0.085
(0.029)** (0.028)*** (0.028)***
Deposit count -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Large deposit count -0.002 -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log population -0.021 -0.023 -0.032 -0.030
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021)
Rural pop share -0.003 -0.002 0.030 0.029
(0.033) (0.032) (0.038) (0.038)
Employment share 0.195 0.109 0.250 0.159
(0.272) (0.276) (0.349) (0.382)
Firm size -0.029 -0.029 -0.034 -0.033
(0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028)
Rural electrification -0.027 -0.002
(0.098) (0.134)
Primary schools per capita -50.581 -52.274
(21.805)** (26.166)*
Government employment share -0.119 -0.119
(0.187) (0.217)
N 1812 1755 1755 1453 1408 1408
r2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions include constituency-year fixed effects. The sample for columns 1 through 3 is all constituencies within
25km of mineral deposits, while columns 4 through 6 exclude constituencies that are within 25km of only the smallest category of deposits (type 3). Columns
2 and 5 introduce demographic constituency-level controls. Columns 3 and 6 use the full set of demographic and political controls. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at the state level.
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however, we do find some evidence that candidates have more criminal cases against them when
mineral prices are high. In contrast, winning candidates are significantly more criminal, across our
different measures of criminality, when mineral prices are high. For a price shock of 1, candidates
are approximately 10 percentage points more likely to have any criminal cases against them, 6.5
percentage points more likely to have serious criminal cases against them and have, on average,
.34 additional criminal cases. We also find that assets and education levels are higher among such
candidates, but these results are not statistically significant.
We now turn to electoral outcomes. Table 2.10 presents findings on the result of price shocks on
number of candidates running for office, ENOP, margin of victory and turnout. We find that price
shocks significantly increase margins of victory, but have no significant effect on other measures of
candidate entry or voter turnout. In order to better understand this increased margin of victory,
Table 2.11 presents our results on incumbent performance. We find that a price shock of 1 is
associated with a 3.4 percentage point increase in the vote share of the local (constituency) incumbent
party, resulting in an 8.4 percentage point increase in the likelihood of reelection. We also find
that a price shock of 1 is associated with a 2.6 percentage point increase in the vote share of the
top performing candidate from the state incumbent ruling coalition. The state incumbent is also
approximately 4 percentage points more likely to win a constituency, although this result is not
statistically significant.
Finally, we test for the effect of price shocks on the same politicians over time. We use a panel of
334 winning candidates who run for reelection in constituencies with mineral deposits. We find that
incumbent criminality does not respond significantly to mineral price shocks. We do find evidence
that assets respond negatively to positive price shocks, a result that will be discussed in the following
section. Of course, given the small sample size, these results should be interpreted cautiously.
2.7.4 Discussion
Following the discussion in Section 2.5, we seek to shed light on three potential effects of mineral
price shocks on political outcomes, each of which has multiple potential channels. The first is the
selection effect, in which lower quality candidates compete when rents from resource extraction are
high. The second is the election effect, in which criminal candidates are more successful in elections
following a mining boom. The third is the moral hazard effect: elected officials change their behavior
in response to high rents or other changes in incentives for those already in political office. The
following sections examine each of these effects in turn.
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Table 2.8: Effect of price shocks on mean candidate characteristics
Criminal Serious Criminal Criminal Count Assets Graduate
Price shock 0.028 0.014 0.166 0.088 -0.026
(0.020) (0.013) (0.080)* (0.074) (0.035)
Deposit count -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Log population -0.017 -0.002 -0.053 -0.059 0.014
(0.009)* (0.005) (0.051) (0.049) (0.006)**
Rural pop share 0.004 -0.000 0.010 0.081 0.003
(0.017) (0.013) (0.083) (0.102) (0.013)
Employment share 0.044 -0.010 0.705 0.658 0.174
(0.118) (0.106) (0.966) (0.821) (0.215)
Firm size -0.007 -0.008 -0.011 0.128 -0.028
(0.008) (0.006) (0.053) (0.058)** (0.022)
Rural electrification -0.035 0.021 0.038 0.596 0.105
(0.052) (0.038) (0.149) (0.211)*** (0.068)
Primary schools per capita -24.293 -10.698 -65.404 -126.116 -10.206
(12.400)* (8.929) (37.574)* (96.512) (20.557)
Government employment share -0.064 0.012 -0.028 -0.340 0.198
(0.073) (0.054) (0.225) (0.347) (0.088)**
N 1755 1755 1755 1754 1730
r2 0.24 0.12 0.14 0.35 0.12
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The sample for all columns is all constituencies within 25km of mineral deposits. The columns, in order, estimate the effect
of price shocks on the share of candidates with any criminal cases pending, the share of candidates with serious criminal cases pending, the mean number of
criminal cases pending against candidates, the natural log of mean candidate assets and the share of politicians who are secondary school graduates. All
regressions include constituency-year fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at the state level.
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Table 2.9: Effect of price shocks on winning candidate characteristics
Criminal Serious Criminal Criminal Count Assets Graduate
Price shock 0.101 0.065 0.335 0.155 0.023
(0.035)*** (0.023)** (0.142)** (0.122) (0.034)
Deposit count -0.000 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001)
Log population -0.023 -0.009 -0.028 -0.017 0.012
(0.019) (0.013) (0.067) (0.063) (0.011)
Rural pop share -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.029 -0.041
(0.032) (0.019) (0.180) (0.140) (0.032)
Employment share 0.109 -0.008 1.074 0.669 0.568
(0.276) (0.197) (2.020) (1.228) (0.403)
Firm size -0.029 -0.019 -0.035 0.092 -0.093
(0.023) (0.012) (0.115) (0.063) (0.028)***
Rural electrification -0.027 0.043 -0.022 0.722 0.123
(0.098) (0.064) (0.431) (0.227)*** (0.097)
Primary schools per capita -50.581 -27.309 -115.807 -157.899 -11.115
(21.805)** (13.830)* (71.941) (108.585) (28.568)
Government employment share -0.119 0.010 -0.267 -0.805 0.106
(0.187) (0.141) (0.605) (0.464)* (0.164)
N 1755 1755 1755 1717 1730
r2 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.26 0.06
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The sample for all columns is all constituencies within 25km of mineral deposits. The columns, in order, estimate the effect
of price shocks on the probability that the winning candidate has any criminal cases pending, the probability that the winning candidate has serious criminal
cases pending, the total number of criminal cases pending against the winning candidate, the natural log of winning candidate assets and the probability that
the winning candidate is a secondary school graduate. All regressions include constituency-year fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust,
clustered at the state level.
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Table 2.10: Effect of price shocks on electoral outcomes
Candidates ENOP Margin Turnout
Price shock -0.019 0.006 0.017 0.006
(0.304) (0.029) (0.005)*** (0.006)
Deposit count -0.003 0.006 -0.000 -0.000
(0.009) (0.002)** (0.000) (0.000)
Log population -0.298 0.030 -0.002 0.004
(0.177) (0.028) (0.004) (0.005)
Rural pop share -0.462 0.042 0.005 0.014
(0.248)* (0.044) (0.005) (0.005)**
Employment share 2.300 -0.468 -0.095 0.085
(1.944) (0.363) (0.048)* (0.058)
Firm size 0.835 0.023 0.007 -0.026
(0.313)** (0.031) (0.004)* (0.007)***
Rural electrification 2.424 -0.121 -0.014 0.059
(0.886)** (0.104) (0.014) (0.019)***
Primary schools per capita -343.153 22.384 9.847 3.021
(235.055) (23.307) (3.232)*** (7.943)
Government employment share -5.490 -0.752 0.029 -0.184
(1.869)*** (0.329)** (0.038) (0.058)***
N 7421 8315 8326 7421
r2 0.51 0.40 0.20 0.66
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The sample for all columns is all constituencies within 25km of mineral
deposits, 1980-2012. The columns, in order, estimate the effect of price shocks on the total number of candidates
running, the effective number of parties, the margin of victory and voter turnout. All regressions include
constituency-year fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at the state level.
Selection effect
Do lower quality politicians compete for office when high mineral prices create higher rents? Brollo et
al. (2013) find evidence that average candidate quality falls in response to an increase in government
revenue. Our results are less clear: we find consistent but insignificant positive increases in mean
candidate criminality associated with high mineral prices. We do find that candidates have, on
average, more criminal cases against them. We also find no significant change in candidate likelihood
of being a high school graduate. We also find no evidence that additional candidates compete for
election when price shocks are high. Our results on a selection effect are, therefore, inconclusive.
Taking seriously for a moment the observed increase in mean criminal cases associated with
positive price shocks, there are multiple ways to interpret the results. In the model of Brollo et al.
(2013), lower quality candidates are attracted to an increase in available rents. In their paper they can
only proxy for candidate quality with education; however, it is not obvious why lower education
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Table 2.11: Effect of price shocks on incumbent performance
Local Inc Margin Local Inc Win State Inc Margin State Inc Win
Price shock 0.034 0.084 0.026 0.042
(0.013)** (0.041)* (0.012)** (0.026)
Deposit count -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Log population -0.013 -0.030 -0.000 -0.008
(0.010) (0.019) (0.006) (0.011)
Rural pop share -0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.008) (0.029) (0.007) (0.018)
Employment share -0.152 -0.185 -0.010 -0.005
(0.102) (0.260) (0.050) (0.127)
Firm size 0.013 0.018 -0.002 -0.009
(0.007)* (0.016) (0.008) (0.014)
Rural electrification 0.018 0.072 0.006 -0.032
(0.034) (0.060) (0.027) (0.052)
Primary schools per capita 17.134 32.981 -1.980 -1.566
(9.275)* (22.589) (6.633) (16.299)
Government employment share -0.011 0.096 0.021 0.040
(0.071) (0.152) (0.049) (0.100)
N 4312 4312 4635 4635
r2 0.21 0.15 0.38 0.26
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The sample for all columns is all constituencies within 25km of mineral
deposits, 1980-2012. The columns, in order, estimate the effect of price shocks on the margin of victory for
the constituency incumbent party, probability of reelection of the constituency incumbent party, the margin
of victory of the state ruling coalition and the probability of victory of the state ruling coalition. Margins
of victory are defined as the vote share of the incumbent candidate minus the vote share of the highest
placing non incumbent candidate. All regressions include constituency-year fixed effects. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at the state level.
candidates are better able to extract rents than those with more education. In contrast, there are
multiple channels by which more criminal politicians may benefit more from an increase in potential
rents. First, with criminal cases already pending, they likely have less to lose from corruption than
candidates not facing criminal conviction. Second, rent extraction is a criminal undertaking; past
criminals are presumably better able to carry it out than those without criminal experience. We
believe that this is particularly true for this particular context, where rent extraction comes not
from government revenue, but from mining companies themselves. The drawback of our measure
of criminality, however, is that it measures criminal cases and not criminal convictions. Criminal
cases may be brought erroneously by politicians in power seeking to limit competition. Thus, what
appears to be a selection effect may in fact be a change in behavior on the part of the ruling party in
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response to a price shock.
Election effect
We now consider whether, conditional on the candidate pool, voters elect lower quality candidates
when mineral prices have increased. We do find strong evidence that in the presence of positive
price shocks, winners are more likely to be criminal, have serious criminal cases against them and
have more total cases against them. What explains such results?
One possibility is that voters actually prefer more criminal politicians during a mining boom.
While at first glance, criminality may seem like a liability to a candidate or a party, there are multiple
demand side reasons why voters may prefer criminal politicians under certain circumstances. In fact,
criminal candidates are twice as likely to win election in India as their non-criminal counterparts
(Vaishnav and Sircar, 2012). The simplest reason is that criminal politicians may have other skills that
voters find desirable and that correlate with criminality. Criminality could signal that a candidate is
willing to work outside the law when necessary. While lawlessness on the part of elected officials
may hamper development in general (Chemin, 2012), a mining boom may be a time when voters
actually prefer a politician to be less restricted by the law. First, if criminal politicians are better
able to convince India’s notoriously slow bureaucracy to make public investments such as roads,
voters will prefer them at times when returns to such investments are high. Second, if mining
companies engage in more extralegal activities during periods of high mineral prices, voters may
prefer politicians who are willing and able to fight back extra-legally.
A second possibility is that criminal politicians may expend more effort to win election when
rents from minerals are high. This effort could come in the form of campaign expenditure, patronage,
voter intimidation or voter fraud. We intend to test this hypothesis in the future using election-
specific crime data. A closely related hypothesis is that parties may favor criminal politicians when
mineral prices are high; such politicians may pay more into state party coffers when potential rents
are high.
Voters also appear to favor incumbent politicians in the presence of positive price shocks. We find
that both local and state incumbents receive a greater vote share when mineral prices are high. This
is consistent with the hypothesis of imperfect information in which voters attribute to incumbent
politicians some of the economic gains that are beyond their control (Cole et al., 2012). Incumbent
politicians may now be able to commit more crimes for a given probability of reelection. We do
not find support for this hypothesis in our incumbent politician panel, but the small sample size
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prevents us from putting too much weight on these results.
Moral hazard
We now consider how incumbent politicians’ behavior responds to changes in mineral wealth, the
“moral hazard” effect. We have already found that margins of victory and incumbency advantages
increase in response to an increase in mineral prices. One might expect incumbents to engage
in worse behavior, given the increased probability of winning the next election. We do not find
evidence in support of this channel. Table 2.12 presents the impact of price shocks on the criminality
and assets of winning politicians who reran in the following election. We find no evidence for an
association between price shocks and incumbent criminality. There are three potential explanations
for this. The first is that our small sample size does not allow us to pick up such effects. The second
is that incumbent politicians are able to prevent the government from bringing charges against them.
The third is that there is no such effect in this context.
Our results do show, however, that incumbent assets are strongly decreasing in price shocks.
At first glance, this result is surprising, as most theories of the political resource curse hinge on
an increase in rents available to politicians. However, we propose three theories for explaining
this finding, particularly in light of our other results. First, changes in mineral prices increase the
long-term value of political office in two important ways: increased incumbency advantages mean
politicians are more likely to be in power in the future, and persistence of price changes increase the
expected value of rents in the future. Thus, politicians solving an intertemporal optimization are
likely to choose to extract more tomorrow if rent seeking today lowers the probability of reelection.
Second, given the common perception of corruption in the mining industry, mineral booms are likely
to increase scrutiny of politician behavior, particularly incumbents. India, for all of its democratic
shortcomings, enjoys a free and tenacious press, the more so after the passage of the Right to
Information Act of 2005 (RTI). Third, if rents come in the form of illegal transfers from or preferential
contracts with mining companies, politicians will seek to keep such transactions private, one part of
which is not having the money flow into their official bank accounts. The rules that provide us with
our data – the requirement that all politicians submit financial and criminal affidavits – provide a
strong incentive to conceal such transactions, a corruption Hawthorne effect of sorts.
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Table 2.12: Effect of price shocks on incumbent assets and criminality in following election
Assets Criminal Serious Criminal Criminal Count
Price shock -0.199 -0.021 0.018 0.082
(0.084)** (0.090) (0.056) (0.357)
Baseline assets 0.569
(0.034)***
Baseline criminal 0.266
(0.095)**
Baseline serious criminal 0.316
(0.042)***
Baseline criminal case count 0.418
(0.104)***
Deposit count 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.009
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.016)
Log population 0.036 0.007 -0.019 0.188
(0.063) (0.053) (0.031) (0.270)
Rural pop share 0.067 0.120 0.075 -0.167
(0.115) (0.057)* (0.043) (0.348)
Employment share 0.048 0.380 -0.361 -1.058
(0.695) (0.559) (0.186)* (1.377)
Firm size -0.179 0.013 0.027 0.188
(0.075)** (0.045) (0.022) (0.167)
Rural electrification 0.219 0.291 0.026 1.295
(0.230) (0.104)** (0.151) (0.942)
Primary schools per capita 237.908 57.558 -19.168 -365.978
(137.070) (41.705) (25.521) (205.625)
Government employment share 0.890 0.539 -0.054 -0.122
(0.719) (0.346) (0.149) (1.260)
N 334 334 334 334
r2 0.70 0.26 0.17 0.25
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Included in the sample for all columns are all incumbent politicians who
run for reelection and we have linked in our data. Outcome variables are, respectively, log candidate assets,
candidate criminality, candidate serious criminality, and the total number of criminal cases pending. All
regressions include constituency-year fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at
the state level.
61
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper we present some of the first microeconomic evidence on the effect of point-source
natural resource wealth on local political outcomes. We interact global price movements with the
locations of mineral deposits in India in order to generate exogenous variation in the value of subsoil
mineral wealth. India is an ideal country for such a study. Its free democratic elections and candidate
disclosure requirements make available the necessary data. India contains a large number of mineral
deposits spread around the country with a high degree of spatial variation. We construct a detailed
constituency-year level dataset of politician characteristics and electoral outcomes to test for the
impact of such shocks and provide insight into the mechanisms by which such effects occur.
We find that positive prices are associated with significant increases in the criminality of winning
candidates for state legislative assembly seats. Margins of victory increase in the presence of high
mineral prices. Incumbency advantages are significantly higher as well: the vote share of both local
incumbents and the state ruling coalition is increasing in the global prices of local mineral deposits.
India is an open democracy with a free press and competitive elections. Nevertheless, we find
strong evidence for a political resource curse. In fact, the evidence suggests that criminality increases
more among winning candidates than the pool of candidates as whole. This may be due to greater
effort on the part of criminal politicians or due to voter preferences for more criminal politicians
during mining booms. The next step in this research is to examine the specifics of politician criminal-
ity. For example, what crimes are increasing in mineral prices? This will allow us to disentangle
questions of politician effort to gain political office versus voter preferences. Regardless, mineral
wealth appears to undermine the quality of democratic representation, particularly problematic in
light of recent findings that more criminal politicians are associated with significant decreases in
constituency welfare (Chemin, 2012).
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Chapter 3
The Employment Effects of Rural
Road Construction1
3.1 Introduction
Universal access to paved roads, much like clean water and consistent electricity, remains an
unreached goal in many developing countries, particularly in rural areas. Fifty-four years after
independence, 33% of Indian villages did not have a paved approach road in 2001 (Population
Census). The absence of such infrastructure raises trade costs and reduces access to both outside
markets and government services. The high costs of infrastructure investments mean that both
economic and political considerations tend to guide their placement, posing challenges for the
estimation of their impact. In this paper we exploit the allocation rules of a large-scale rural road
construction program in India to estimate the impact of feeder roads on rural nonfarm economic
activity.
The Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) – the Prime Minister’s Village Road Program –
was launched in 2000 with the goal of providing all-weather access to unconnected habitations across
India. The government developed specific guidelines to prioritize large, unconnected habitations:
those with populations above 1000 were to receive highest priority, followed by those with populations
above 500. Lower priority was given to smaller localities and those with existing “fair-weather”
roads. At the start, about 170,000 habitations were eligible for the program, a number that has grown
1Co-authored with Paul Novosad.
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as the guidelines have been expanded to include smaller habitations. By March 2011, over 420,000
km of roads had been sanctioned to connect nearly 110,000 habitations at a cost of 1.19 trillion INR
($27 billion) (Ministry of Rural Development, 2012).
These rules provide us with three distinct ways to estimate the impact of a new road on
rural economic activity. First, we provide OLS estimates of the relationship between PMGSY road
construction and employment growth, based on the timing of road construction in villages that
eventually received roads. However, endogenous timing of road construction creates unknown
bias in these estimates. We address this in two ways. Program rules create discontinuities in the
likelihood of receiving a road at populations of 500 and 1000, allowing us to use a fuzzy regression
discontinuity approach to estimate the impact. Finally, we take advantage of the fact that planning
and implementation was carried out at the district level. As a result, the probability of receiving a
road early in the program was a function not only of village size, but also of its relative size within
its district. We are thus able to instrument for road treatment with the within-district population
rank, controlling flexibly for population.
We construct a new dataset that combines data on road construction with village characteristics
and economic outcomes. We match Population Census data (1991, 2001) to Economic Census data
(1998, 2005) to measure the economic consequences of road construction during the first five years
of the PMGSY (2000-04). The Economic Census is a complete enumeration of nonfarm economic
establishments in India, covering over 4000 towns and 500,000 villages. It contains, among other
variables, data on employment and industrial sector for each establishment, allowing us to estimate
the effect of rural roads on employment growth, firm size and formality.
We interpret the construction of a village feeder road under the PMGSY as a large reduction
in the costs of moving goods, capital and people to and from a village. Theoretically, it is unclear
what impact such a change in factor mobility should have on village economic activity. For example,
out-migration may increase as the costs of travel decrease, or fall as economic opportunity expands in
the village. Nonfarm employment may grow as firms serving outside demand now face sufficiently
low transportation costs to be competitive in outside markets; alternatively, villages may further
specialize in agriculture as trade for outside goods becomes more feasible. Increasing returns to scale,
such as those due to fixed costs, would predict that certain firms may only exist when transport
costs are low enough to enable them to access markets beyond the confines of a village. Thus
road construction may not result in the specialization predicted by simple trade models but rather
diversification of the village economy as it becomes integrated into a larger trade network.
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We find that the construction of a road results in a significant increase in nonfarm village
employment. While our results vary depending on the specification, all estimates predict over 100
percent growth in nonfarm employment upon receiving a road. As we assign treatment based on
road completion, we interpret these not as temporary increases due to ongoing construction but
medium-term changes in the level of village employment. In future work, we will test whether these
results represent a change in the level or growth rate of village employment, a distinction recently
explored in research on the economic impact of railroads in China (Banerjee et al., 2012b).
In addition to aggregate nonfarm employment, we find evidence that roads facilitate significant
structural transformation and diversification of the local economy. Average village firm size increases,
as does the number of industries present in the village. These findings are consistent with evidence
from Nepal suggesting that villages closer to cities serve much larger markets, with greater special-
ization of household economic activities but greater diversification at the village level (Fafchamps
and Shilpi, 2005). Further, we provide evidence that growth is significantly higher in villages that
also have a supply of electricity, suggesting significant complementarities between transportation
and power infrastructure.
We also provide some of the first well-identified estimates of the cost effectiveness of rural
road construction. We find that, assuming no positive or negative employment spillovers to non-
treated villages, $1,000,000 in rural road construction generates between 500 and 700 nonfarm
jobs, or approximately $1400 to $2000 per job. Given that India’s per capita GDP in 2005 was
$732, our findings suggest very high returns to rural road construction, a conclusion supported by
other attempts to estimate the returns to infrastructure investment (Fan and Hazell, 2001). These
results should be interpreted with caution, as we do not observe concurrent changes to agricultural
employment, and thus are unable to estimate changes in total village employment.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 summarizes the most relevant literature
on transport costs and rural roads. Section 3.3 provides a description of the PMGSY rural road
construction program. Section 3.4 describes our empirical strategies. Section 3.5 explains the data
used. Section 3.6 presents results and discussion. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Literature
Recent years have seen a renewed interest in the importance of transportation costs in facilitating
growth and development, particularly in the trade literature. Limao and Venables (2001) use
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quotes from a shipping company and other sources of data to estimate the impact of inter-country
transportation costs on trade flows, concluding that much of the low trade volume in sub-Saharan
Africa is due to high transportation costs that result from poor quality infrastructure. Djankov et
al. (2010) estimate that every additional day required to ship a container between two countries is
associated with a reduction in bilateral trade of more than 1%, in addition to causing a distortion
in trade away from time-sensitive exports. Intra-national transport costs exacerbate the challenge
of realizing gains from trade; Atkin and Donaldson (2012) estimate that internal trade costs in
Ethiopia and Nigeria are 7-15 times larger than in the United States, greatly reducing the benefits of
globalization.
Infrastructure has long been one of the priorities of economic development policy and research:
fully 15% of World Bank spending between 1995 and 2005 was dedicated to infrastructure projects,
with 42% of that amount spent in China and India alone (The World Bank, 2007). Recent research has
utilized novel identification strategies to investigate the link between the expansion of infrastructure
and local economic performance. Banerjee et al. (2012b) examine the impact of railroads in China,
finding that while railroads caused a level increase in income, nearby locations grew no faster than
farther locations during a nearly 20 year period of rapid economic growth. Storeygard (2012) interacts
global oil price shocks with distances to the nearest port to investigate the impact of transport costs
on urban economic activity in Africa, finding a significant inverse relationship between transport
costs and urban economic output, as proxied by nighttime luminosity. Donaldson (2012) develops a
multi-region, multi-commodity trade model to assess the impact of railroad construction in colonial
India, estimating that the expansion of the railroad network into a region increased real income by
approximately 16% and greatly reduced trade costs. Michaels (2008) finds that the construction of
the US Interstate Highway System generates sectoral and wage growth consistent with standard
trade theory.
Another strand of research estimates the impact of changes in market access rather than average
transportation costs generally. Redding and Sturm (2008) find that cities close to the border between
West and East Germany experienced population loss relative to cities further from the border whose
market access was less impeded by the partition of Germany following World War II. Hornbeck
and Donaldson (2012) seek to unite the market access literature with the infrastructure literature
by estimating the impact of railroads on agricultural land values using a market access approach,
finding that the railroad network had by 1890 more than tripled the total value of agricultural land
in the United States.
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Of course, there are many reasons why rural roads may have very different economic effects when
compared to core infrastructure projects such as interstate highways and long-distance railroads.
Casaburi et al. (2012) use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to examine the effect of village
feeder roads on agricultural markets, finding that such roads significantly lower market prices of
local agricultural goods. Gollin and Rogerson (2010) build a multi-sector model and calibrate it using
data from Uganda to understand the relationship between agricultural productivity, transport costs
and economic activity. They predict that high transport costs produce inefficiently high specialization
in agriculture, and that investments in road infrastructure would lead to significant reallocation of
labor to the nonfarm economy. Khandker et al. (2009) use propensity score matching to evaluate
the impact of a rural road program in Bangladesh, estimating that receiving a road lowers village
poverty by 5-6% while increasing household consumption by 8-10%, although subsequent work
suggests that some of these gains may not persist over time (Khandker and Koolwal, 2011). Most
closely related to this paper, Banerjee et al. (2012c) study the impact of the PMGSY on a broad range
of outcomes in a sample of 267 villages in Uttar Pradesh. They find that road construction results in
greater access to government services, lower consumer prices, higher agricultural prices, increased
employment outside of agriculture and less daily migration, with no effect on longer-term migration.
While the majority of evidence points towards large economic gains from the construction of rural
roads, some studies have suggested that low incomes and population densities in rural areas may
not generate sufficient demand for transportation services on rural roads (Raballand et al., 2011).
Methodologically, our use of within-district population rank is similar to Andrabi et al. (2013),
who use local population rank to instrument for the placement of a girls’ secondary school. Banerjee
et al. (2012c) also use within-district population rank to estimate the effects of the PMGSY although,
as discussed above, their focus is on the response of households, rather than firms, to the construction
of a new road.
3.3 Context and background
The Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) – the Prime Minister’s Village Road Program –
was launched in 2000 with the goal of providing all-weather access to unconnected habitations across
India. The focus was on the provision of new feeder roads to localities that did not have access,
although in practice many projects under the scheme upgraded pre-existing roads. Originally, the
stated goal was to provide all habitations with populations greater than 1000 with connectivity by
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2003 and all habitations with population greater than 500 with connectivity by 2007. These thresholds
were to be lower in desert and tribal areas, as well as hilly states and districts affected by left-wing
extremism.2
Although funded and overseen by the federal Ministry of Rural Development, responsibility
for road construction was delegated to state governments. District Rural Road Plans were drafted
for every district in India. Funding comes by a combination of taxes on diesel fuel (0.75 INR per
liter), central government support and loans from the Asian Development Bank and World Bank. By
March 2011, over 420,000 km of roads had been sanctioned to connect nearly 110,000 habitations at a
cost of 1.19 trillion INR ($27 billion) (Ministry of Rural Development, 2012).3 The mandate of the
program has recently been expanded to include all habitations with populations above 100.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
Our goal is to estimate the effect of the construction of a new rural road on changes in village-level
economic activity. We start by estimating the OLS relationship between road construction and village
employment growth using the following estimating equation:
Yv,s,t = β0 + β1 ∗ newroadv,s + ζXv,s,t−1 + ηs + ǫv,t−1, (3.1)
where Yv,s,t is log employment in village v in state s at time t, and newroad indicates that a new
feeder road was constructed in village v at time t, Xv,s,t−1 is a vector of village controls measured at
baseline, and ηs is a state fixed effect.
The problem with this approach is that roads are not allocated at random. Roads are expensive
infrastructural investments likely to be demanded by nearly all unconnected villages. Governments
may target such investments to locations that are particularly needy, or have high potential for
growth, or are politically connected or favored by powerful politicians. Controlling for baseline
village characteristics or regional fixed effects will reduce this bias, but it remains a concern at the
heart of the literature on infrastructure.
We undertake three strategies to mitigate bias from selection in the placement of roads: (i) using
2Habitations are defined as clusters of population whose location does not change over time. They are
distinct from, but form parts of, revenue villages used by the Economic and Population Censuses. See National
Rural Roads Development Agency (2005) for more details.
3We use an exchange rate of 44.06 INR per USD, the average for 2005
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Table 3.1: Tabulation of Villages Receiving PMGSY Roads by Year
Year Completed
Year Sanctioned 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
2000 6 166 609 1080 990 604 315 419 111 61 4361
2001 0 0 21 720 1387 1372 704 316 161 126 4807
2003 0 0 0 2 403 1251 1153 682 364 266 4121
2004 0 0 0 0 0 300 774 791 861 474 3200
2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 178 1108 1541 1839 4666
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 569 1047 2263 3880
2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 134 1150 1284
2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 149 149
Total 6 166 630 1802 2780 3527 3125 3885 4219 6328 26468
OLS to exploit variation in the timing of PMGSY road construction; (ii) using regression discontinuity
to exploit population thresholds that determine road priority; (iii) using an instrumental variable
approach to exploit within-district population ranking of villages, which is an additional determinant
of road prioritization.
3.4.1 Road timing (OLS)
The naive OLS is biased because the types of villages that receive new rural roads differ on many
unobserved characteristics from the types of villages that do not receive new roads. By limiting
our sample to villages that eventually did receive PMGSY roads, and exploiting the timing of road
construction, we can eliminate any confounders that differ between villages that did and did not
receive new roads.
Table 3.1 shows the number of rural roads built under the PMGSY in each year. Of the 75,399
roads in our sample that were built by 2009, 25,354 were built by 2005, the year in which we measure
employment outcomes.4 We then estimate Equation 3.1 on this limited sample, where the treatment
variable indicates that a road was built before 2005.
Under the assumption that the order in which roads were constructed under the PMGSY is
uncorrelated with other factors that affect growth, this would be an unbiased estimate of the effect of
rural roads on village outcomes. However, this assumption is tenuous: order of construction is likely
to be influenced by both political and economic factors that could bias OLS estimates either upwards
or downwards.
4The 2005 Economic Census was conducted from late 2005 to early 2006.
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3.4.2 Population priority thresholds (RD)
Timing of road construction is endogenous, which means the OLS estimates of the effects of roads
are likely to be biased. In order to overcome this endogeneity, we exploit the population thresholds
intended to guide the allocation of roads under the PMGSY. State implementing officials were
instructed to target habitations in the following order: (i) habitations with population greater than
1000; (ii) habitations with populations greater than 500; and lastly, (iii) habitations with populations
greater than 250.
Even if selection into PMGSY treatment is biased by political or economic factors, these factors
are not likely to change discontinuously at these population thresholds. If these rules were followed
to any degree by state officials, the likelihood of PMGSY treatment will discontinuously increase at
these population thresholds, making it possible to estimate the effect of the program using a fuzzy
regression discontinuity design.
Under the assumption of continuity at the treatment threshold, the fuzzy RD estimator (Imbens
and Lemieux, 2008) estimates the local average treatment effect (LATE) of receiving a new road, for a
village with population equal to the threshold:
τ =
limpop→T+ E[Yv|popv = T]− limpop→T− E[Yv|popv = T]
limpop→T+ E[newroadv|popv = T]− limpop→T− E[newroadv|popv = T]
, (3.2)
where popi is habitation population, T is the threshold population, and newroadi is an indicator
variable for whether village v received a new road in the sample period.
A given population threshold increases the probability of receiving a road by a different amount
in different states. For example, states with a large number of large, unconnected villages, are more
likely to have large first stages at the high threshold of 1,000. Analysis of PMGSY documentation
and discussions with public officials have led us to focus on the population threshold of 500, in five
major states which cover a large share of the geographic and economic diversity of India: Gujarat,
Chhattisgarh, Assam, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu.
We estimate the reduced form fuzzy RD using equation 3.3:
Yv,s,t = β0 + β1(popv,s,t−1 > T) + β2popv,s,t−1 + β3popv,s,t−1 ∗ (popv,s,t−1 > T) + ζXv,s,t−1 + ηs + ǫv,s,t,
(3.3)
where Yv,s,t is log village employment at time t, T is the population threshold of 500, popv,s,t is
habitation population at time t, Xv,s,t−1 is a vector of village controls measured at baseline, and ηs is
a state fixed effect. Village controls and state fixed effects are not necessary for identification but
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improve the efficiency of the estimation. The local average treatment effect of a road, identified in a
village at the population threshold T, is β1 + β3 ∗ T. For ease of exposition, we subtract the threshold
value 500 from the population variable, such that T = 0, and β1 fully describes the treatment effect.
The fuzzy regression discontinuity approach accurately identifies the treatment effect of rural
roads, under the assumption that crossing the population threshold affects the probability of receiving
a road, and nothing else of significance. There are two potential threats to this identification strategy.
First, if other village characteristics vary discontinuously at the threshold in a way that we are unable
to control for (e.g. if participation in other government programs uses the same thresholds), then our
estimates will be biased. Second, if the running variable (habitation population) can be manipulated,
randomness of assignment at the threshold is violated. We discuss this possibility when we describe
results from the regression discontinuity strategy below.
3.4.3 Population rank (IV)
In addition to the population threshold rules, district-level planning and implementation of the
PMGSY meant that priorization was determined not only by population but also by relative pop-
ulation ranking within a district: a village would receive higher prioritization than an equivalent
village if it had fewer larger eligible villages in its district. Holding population constant, a village in a
district with many larger unconnected villages is less likely to receive a new road under the PMGSY.
Under the assumption that, after controlling flexibly for total population, the population rank of a
village within a district does not affect a village’s growth prospects except through the likelihood of
receiving a road through PMGSY, instrumental variable estimation provides an unbiased estimate of
the effect of a rural road (Angrist and Lavy, 1999).
Our empirical specification is:
Yv,s = β0 + β1 ∗ newroadv,s + β2 f (popv,s) + ζXv,s + ηs + ǫv,s (3.4)
where Yv,s is the outcome of interest in village v in state s, newroadv,s is an indicator for whether the
village received a road under the PMGSY, f (popv,s) is a function of village population, Xv,s is a vector
of village controls and ηs is a state fixed effect. We estimate Equation 3.4 using RANKv,s, the within-
district population rank of village v, as an instrument for newroadv,s. In alternate specifications,
in order to reduce noise, we instrument for newroadv,s with a dummy variable indicating that
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RANKv,s < 75.
5
The estimation provides an unbiased estimate of the effect of a new rural road on employment
growth, so long as the exclusion restriction is not violated: RANKv,d,t−1 must affect growth only
through the increased likelihood of obtaining a new road under the PMGSY. In Section 3.6 we discuss
robustness checks to ensure satisfaction of the exclusion restriction.
3.5 Data
3.5.1 PMGSY
Data on the PMGSY is generated through the Online Management and Monitoring System (OMMS),
the software used in program tracking and implementation. These data are not a survey - they are
the administrative records of the actual program. Data include but are not limited to road sanctioning
and completion dates, cost and time overruns, contractor names, and quality monitoring reports.
PMGSY data are reported at either the habitation or the road level. There is a many-to-many
correspondence between habitations and roads: roads serve multiple habitations, and habitations
may be connected to multiple roads. Habitations are subsets of census villages, which tend to
comprise between one and three habitations; approximately 200,000 villages consist of only a single
habitation.
3.5.2 Economic and population census
The Indian Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI) conducted the 4th and 5th
Economic Censuses respectively in 1998 and 2005.6 The Economic Census is a complete enumeration
of all economic establishments except those engaged in crop production and plantation; there is no
minimum firm size, and both formal and informal establishments are included.
The Economic Census records information on the town or village of each establishment, whether
ownership is public or private, the number and demographic characteristics of employees, the
sources of electricity and finance, and the caste group of the owner. The main product of the firm is
also coded using the 4-digit National Industrial Classification (NIC), which corresponds roughly
to a 4-digit ISIC code. More detailed information on income or capital is not included. The main
5Our results are robust to different cutoffs for this dummy variable and are available upon request.
6The 6th Economic Census is ongoing at the beginning of 2013.
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strengths of the data are its comprehensiveness, and rich detail on spatial location and industrial
classification of firms.
We obtained location directories for the Economic Censuses, and then used a series of fuzzy
matching algorithms to match villages and towns by name to the population censuses of 1991 and
2001.7 We were able to match approximately 93% of villages between 1998 and 2005. We also use
data from the Population Census of India in 1991 and 2001, which includes village population and
other demographic data, as well as information on local public infrastructure (roads, electricity,
schools and hospitals).
We matched PMGSY data to economic and population census data at the village level, using
population census codes where they were reported in the PMGSY, and a Hindi-language fuzzy
matching algorithm to match village names across the two datasets. We successfully matched over
85% of habitations listed in the PMGSY to their corresponding population census villages.
Table 3.2 shows village-level summary statistics for the entire sample of villages used in our
analysis.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N
New road 0.049 (0.216) 181232
Employment (1998) 68.079 (100.469) 181232
Employment (2005) 84.257 (119.934) 181232
Ln employment growth 0.213 (0.876) 181232
Firm count (1998) 33.719 (45.697) 181232
Firm count (2005) 45.368 (60.037) 181232
Ln firm count growth 0.289 (0.842) 181232
2001 Population 1422.329 (1021.174) 181232
Pop growth 1991-2001 1.202 (0.263) 181232
Irrigation share 0.431 (0.365) 174649
Ln land area 5.363 (1.085) 174649
Distance from town 20.832 (19.453) 180783
Diversity (1998) 8.727 (6.503) 181232
7The Economic Census of 1998 was conducted with the house listing for the 1991 population census, while
the 2005 Economic Census used codes from the 2001 population census.
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Table 3.3: OLS: Employment growth on roads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
New road before 2005 0.113 0.079 0.058 0.036
(0.019)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.017)**
Baseline log employment -0.275 -0.328 -0.477 -0.496
(0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)***
Population 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)***
Share of land irrigated 0.099 0.078
(0.024)*** (0.026)***
Log(land area) 0.141 0.126
(0.008)*** (0.008)***
Distance from town -0.002 -0.002
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
Baseline number of industries 0.024 0.026
(0.002)*** (0.002)***
Constant 1.115 1.734 1.305 1.377
(0.030)*** (0.063)*** (0.078)*** (0.078)***
N 48216 48216 46720 34888
r2 0.13 0.17 0.21 0.22
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. This table presents OLS estimates of the relationship between log employment
growth (1998-2005) and treatment, as defined as having received a completed PMGSY road by 2005. The sample
is all locations that received a PMGSY road before 2012. Column 1 presents the estimate only controlling for
1998 (log) employment and village population. Column 2 introduces state fixed effects. Column 3 introduces
standard village level controls of share of land irrigated, log land area, distance from nearest town and number
of non-farm industries present in 1998. Column 4 limits to villages in which the largest habitation had fewer
than 1500 people. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 OLS
Table 3.3 presents OLS estimates of the relationship between log employment growth (1998-2005)
and treatment, defined as having received a completed PMGSY road by 2005. The sample is all
locations that received a PMGSY road before 2012. Column 1 presents the estimate only controlling
for 1998 (log) employment and village population. Column 2 introduces state fixed effects. Column
3 introduces standard village level controls of share of land irrigated, log land area, distance from
nearest town and number of non-farm industries present in 1998. Column 4 limits to villages in
which the largest habitation had fewer than 1500 people. Standard errors are clustered at the district
level.
The table shows that villages that received a new PMGSY road by 2005 on average had non-farm
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employment growth that was 3-12 log points higher than villages that did not receive a new road.
The point estimates fall as more controls are included, suggesting that selection of villages for roads
is non-random. In particular, the falling coefficient as state fixed effects are included suggests that
higher growth states were more likely to implement the program early - this is consistent with reports
that state administrative capacity played an important role in early implementation of PMGSY.
3.6.2 Regression discontinuity
Table 3.4 presents regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of PMGSY prioritization on a
village’s likelihood of receiving a road. Habitations with a population greater than 500 should have
received higher priority than habitations with population under 500. The dependent variable in
these regressions is an indicator variable that is set to 1 if a village received a road by 2005. The
running variable is the population of the largest habitation in the village. The treatment variable is
an indicator that is set to 1 if the largest habitation has a population greater than or equal to 500.
The value 500 has been subtracted from population values, so that the coefficient on the uninteracted
treatment variable is the estimate of the treatment effect.
Columns 1-3 show estimates from the local linear specification (Equation 3.3). Column 1 is the
baseline specification without controls. Column 2 adds state fixed effects, and column 3 adds village
level controls from the 1991 population census, which are log land area, share of land that is irrigated,
distance to the nearest town, and the number of different industries in the village in 1998. Column 4
adds a 4th degree polynomial in habitation population. The estimations show a robust and highly
significant effect of the population threshold on the probability of a village receiving a new road. A
village is on average 3% more likely to receive a new road if the population of the largest habitation
is just above 500 than if the population is just below 500. Figure 3.1 depicts graphically the increase
in probability of receiving a new road when the largest habitation is just above the threshold.
The bandwidth used in all specifications is 250, so the sample for the estimation are villages with
a largest habitation in the range of 250-750, but results are robust to alternate bandwidth choices. All
standard errors are clustered at the district level to account for spatial correlation. Controls and fixed
effects are not necessary for identification, but their inclusion increases the efficiency of the estimator.
Table 3.5 presents instrumental variable regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of
receiving a new road under the PMGSY on log non-farm employment growth from 1998-2005. As
above, the running variable is the population of the largest habitation in the village, and a dummy
variable indicating population greater than 500 instruments for a village’s receiving a PMGSY road
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Table 3.4: First stage: RD estimates of effect of population threshold on probability of new road
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1(Pop ≥ 500) 0.034 0.031 0.030 0.034
(0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.016)**
Population -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population * 1(Pop ≥ 500) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Share of land irrigated -0.004 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007)
Log(land area) 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
Distance from town -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Baseline number of industries 0.001 0.001
(0.000)* (0.000)*
Constant 0.016 0.012 0.010 0.007
(0.006)*** (0.006)** (0.018) (0.018)
N 28747 28747 26440 26440
r2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The table presents regression discontinuity estimates from Equation 3.3 of
the effect of PMGSY prioritization on a village’s likelihood of receiving a road. The dependent variable is an
indicator variable that is set to 1 if a village received a road by 2005. The running variable is the population
of the largest habitation in the village, and the treatment variable is an indicator that is set to 1 if the largest
habitation has a population greater than or equal to 500. Columns 1-3 show estimates from the local linear
specification, and column 4 includes a quartic in population. Column 2 adds state fixed effects, and column
3 adds village level controls from the 1991 population census, which are log land area, share of land that is
irrigated, distance to the nearest town, and the number of different industries in the village in 1998. The value
500 has been subtracted from population values, so that the coefficient on the uninteracted treatment variable is
the estimate of the treatment effect. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
by 2005. Columns 1-3 show local linear specifications. Column 2 adds state fixed effects, column 3
adds village-level controls, and column 4 adds a quartic in population. The estimates show a very
large and statistically significant effect of a new feeder road on rural non-farm employment. A new
feeder road more than doubles the growth of non-farm employment. Effect sizes range from 120 to
240 log points, reflecting the high variation in growth rates across villages.8 Controls, clustering and
bandwidth are the same as in Table 3.4. All regressions include an additional control for non-farm
employment in 1998.
A standard regression discontinuity validity test is that the density of the running variable is
8We omit villages with non-farm employment less than 10 or greater than 200 in 1998. The median village
has employment of 180, so this effect is not driven by growth in villages with very small levels of employment.
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Figure 3.1: First stage: population threshold and new rural roads
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The figure shows the share of habitations that received a road, by population. Each point represents approxi-
mately 1000 habitations in the top panel, and 300 habitations in the bottom panel. The PMGSY instructed states
to target roads to habitations with population greater than 500, the value indicated by the solid vertical line.
continuous across the treatment threshold. The standard test recommended by McCrary (2008)
cannot be applied, because the population threshold affects both the probability of receiving a new
road, and selection into the RD sample.9 The histogram of PMGSY-listed populations of habitations
that received roads by 2011 (the RD sample) is displayed in Figure 3.2, with clear discontinuous
increases in density at the population thresholds of 250 and 500. Figure 3.3 shows the histogram of
village population in the 2001 population census, where there is no evident sign of a discontinuity at
either of the PMGSY thresholds.
3.6.3 IV
In this section we present results from the IV specification described in Section 3.4.3. We first verify
that within-district village population rank appears to be a valid instrument and then discuss results
of this estimation strategy.
We define our sample to be villages listed as not having paved roads at the time of the 2001
Population Census. This is for two reasons. First, villages unconnected by paved all-weather roads
9The sample for the RD is all villages in which a PMGSY project was sanctioned by 2012. Habitations with
populations greater than 500 are more likely to be prioritized and receive a road by 2005, which drives our
empirical result. However, habitations with population greater than 500 are also more likely to receive a road by
2011, which drives selection into the sample. An alternate approach which would not face this issue would be
to use the entire set of Indian villages as a control group - but with fewer than 40,000 out of 600,000+ villages
connected, the increased probability of receiving a road under PMGSY is too small to detect.
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Table 3.5: RD estimates of effect of new road on employment growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
r05 2.355 1.893 1.282 1.351
(0.528)*** (0.530)*** (0.502)** (0.678)**
Population -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000)** (0.000)* (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Population * 1(Pop ≥ 500) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share of land irrigated 0.193 0.192
(0.021)*** (0.022)***
Log(land area) 0.216 0.215
(0.008)*** (0.009)***
Distance from town -0.003 -0.003
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
Baseline number of industries 0.013 0.013
(0.001)*** (0.002)***
Constant 1.224 1.520 0.643 0.644
(0.022)*** (0.046)*** (0.064)*** (0.077)***
N 19288 19288 18972 16196
r2 0.00 0.05 0.17 0.17
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The table presents instrumental variable regression discontinuity estimates of
the effect of receiving a new road under the PMGSY on log non-farm employment growth from 1998-2005. The
dependent variable is village level non-farm employment growth from 1998-2005. The running variable is the
population of the largest habitation in the village, and the treatment indicator of population greater than 500
instruments for a village receiving a PMGSY road by 2005. Columns 1-3 show estimates from the local linear
specification, and column 4 includes a quartic in population. Column 2 adds state fixed effects, and column
3 adds village level controls from the 1991 population census, which are log land area, share of land that is
irrigated, distance to the nearest town, and the number of different industries in the village in 1998. The value
500 has been subtracted from population values, so that the coefficient on the uninteracted treatment variable
is the estimate of the treatment effect. All columns include a control for log non-farm employment in 1998.
Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
to the road network are listed as the highest priority under the PMGSY. Second, we can be confident
that roads to such villages are in fact new roads and not upgrades of existing roads, in order to be
able to more cleanly interpret the results. The sample is further restricted to villages in districts in
which the PMGSY built roads to more than 5% of villages by 2005. Finally, because few villages with
very high within-district population ranks (very small villages) receive roads under the PMGSY, we
drop villages with population ranks above 300. These sample definitions yield a sample of 12073
eligible villages in our rank IV sample, out of which 1910 received PMGSY roads by 2005.
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Figure 3.2: Histogram of PMGSY-project population (SP)
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The figure displays a histogram of habitation population as recorded in the PMGSY project data. The density
bulges at 250 and 500 reflect the project’s prioritization of villages with population greater than 500, and then
greater than 250.
First stage and reduced form
We define our rank instrument two ways. The first is a simple field rank that assigns a village a rank
of the number of villages in the sample with populations greater than the village, plus one. The
second creates a binary variable out of this rank that takes on the value 1 when a village rank is less
than 75. Table 3.6 presents the results of the first stage, regressing an indicator for the completion
of a PMGSY road by 2005 on these two rank instruments. For simplicity of presentation, the rank
variable has been divided by 100. Columns 1 and 2 present the effect of rank on the probability
that a village receives a road by 2005 with quadratic and quartic polynomial population controls,
respectively. A reduction of rank of 100 is associated with a 4 to 5 percentage point increase in the
probability of receiving a road, controlling for population. Columns 3 and 4 present the effect of our
binary instrument on the likelihood of receiving a PMGSY road by 2005: being in the top 75 villages
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Figure 3.3: Histogram of population (population census 2001)
0
5.
0e
−0
4
.
00
1
.
00
15
D
en
si
ty
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Population (Census 2001)
The figure displays a histogram of village population as recorded in the 2001 population census. The PMGSY
eligibility thresholds of 250 and 500 do not show obvious changes in density.
within one’s district is, after controlling for population and other village characteristics, associated
with an approximately 5.5 percentage point increase in the probability of receiving a PMGSY road.
The results are little changed by adding additional population controls, which is reassuring for the
validity of the instruments.
Table 3.7 presents the reduced form results. The dependent variable in all four columns is log
nonfarm employment growth. Columns 1 and 2 show that an increase in rank of 100 (decrease
in prioritization for PMGSY road) is associated with a reduction of approximately 7 log points
of employment growth, with negligible change when going from quadratic to quartic population
controls. Likewise, columns 3 and 4 show that having a rank of less than 75 is associated with an
increase of approximately 6 log points of employment growth.
One concern is that the rank instrument may be correlated with prioritization not only in
the PMGSY but in other government programs that are also carried out at the district level. We
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Table 3.6: First stage effect of rank on probability of receiving road
1 2 3 4
Pop rank (no road) -0.047 -0.043
(0.007)*** (0.007)***
Top pop (no road) 0.056 0.055
(0.008)*** (0.008)***
Ln baseline employment -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Village pop 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)***
Village pop 2 -0.001 -0.016 -0.001 -0.017
(0.000)*** (0.006)*** (0.000)*** (0.006)***
Village pop 3 0.053 0.058
(0.023)** (0.023)**
Village pop 4 -0.006 -0.007
(0.003)** (0.003)**
Pop growth 1991-2001 -0.065 -0.066 -0.066 -0.067
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)***
Irrigation share 0.018 0.017 0.015 0.013
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Ln land area 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.008
(0.004)** (0.004)* (0.004)** (0.004)*
Distance from town -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Diversity (1998) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 12073 12073 12073 12073
r2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. This table presents first stage regressions using within-district population
rank as a predictor of receipt of a PMGSY road by 2005. All regressions weight by baseline log employment
and include state fixed effects, as well as the following village level controls: 1991-2001 population growth,
share of land irrigated, log land area, distance from nearest town and economic diversity as measured in the
1998 Economic Census. Columns 1 and 2 define population rank as the count of in-district, in-sample villages
with greater populations, plus 1. Columns 3 and 4 use a binary variable that takes the value 1 when this
rank is less than 75. Columns 1 and 3 use quadratic population controls, while Columns 2 and 4 use quartic
population controls. Sample is comprised of villages listed as not having a paved approach road in the 2001
Population Census. We further limit to villages in districts that constructed PMGSY roads in more than 5%
of villages and villages whose within-district population rank is less than 300. Reported standard errors are
heteroskedasticity-robust.
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Table 3.7: Reduced form effect of rank on employment growth
1 2 3 4
Pop rank (no road) -0.073 -0.069
(0.016)*** (0.016)***
Top pop (no road) 0.060 0.059
(0.018)*** (0.018)***
Ln baseline employment -0.610 -0.610 -0.608 -0.608
(0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)***
Village pop 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003
(0.000)*** (0.001)** (0.000)*** (0.001)***
Village pop 2 -0.001 -0.024 -0.001 -0.026
(0.000)** (0.013)* (0.000)*** (0.013)**
Village pop 3 0.087 0.094
(0.050)* (0.049)*
Village pop 4 -0.011 -0.012
(0.007) (0.007)*
Pop growth 1991-2001 -0.122 -0.123 -0.123 -0.124
(0.034)*** (0.034)*** (0.034)*** (0.034)***
Irrigation share 0.107 0.105 0.104 0.102
(0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.026)***
Ln land area -0.040 -0.041 -0.041 -0.042
(0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)***
Distance from town -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Diversity (1998) 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
N 12073 12073 12073 12073
r2 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. This table presents reduced form regressions using within-district population
rank as a predictor of log employment growth between 1998 and 2005. All regressions weight by baseline log
employment and include state fixed effects, as well as the following village level controls: 1991-2001 population
growth, share of land irrigated, log land area, distance from nearest town and economic diversity as measured
in the 1998 Economic Census. Columns 1 and 2 define population rank as the count of in-district, in-sample
villages with greater populations, plus 1. Columns 3 and 4 use a binary variable that takes the value 1 when
this rank is less than 75. Columns 1 and 3 use quadratic population controls, while Columns 2 and 4 use quartic
population controls. Sample is comprised of villages listed as not having a paved approach road in the 2001
Population Census. We further limit to villages in districts that constructed PMGSY roads in more than 5%
of villages and villages whose within-district population rank is less than 300. Reported standard errors are
heteroskedasticity-robust.
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thus define a placebo sample of villages with equivalent rankings as our rank IV sample but in
districts that did not construct PMGSY roads in more than 1% of villages. Table 3.8 presents the
results of the same reduced form specification discussed above but in this placebo sample. We
find insignificant effects of both the continuous and binary population rank instruments on village
nonfarm employment growth. We take this as suggestive, if not conclusive, evidence that the village
population rank affects employment growth only through its impact on the likelihood of receiving a
PMGSY road.
Rank IV estimates
Table 3.10 presents the results of the IV estimation based on Equation 3.4. As in the preceding
tables, the first two columns use RANK as the excluded instrument for the construction of a road,
while columns 3 and 4 use the binary low rank variable. We find that a new road leads to highly
significant positive increases in nonfarm employment growth. Regardless of specification, a new
road is associated with an increase of employment growth of over 100 log points. Table 3.9 seeks to
unpackage these results, instrumenting for new road with only the binary rank variable. Column 1
estimates the effect of a new road on the number of economic establishments (in logs); in contrast to
the highly significant positive results for employment growth, the estimated effect on firm count is
smaller and less significant. Consistent with this result, column 2 finds that a new road is associated
with a large and significant increase in firm size: the mean firm employs more than 1 additional
employee than in villages that do not receive roads. Column 3 estimates the treatment effect on
the percent change in economic diversity of the village. We follow Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009)
in defining the diversity of a village economy as the number of industries present in the village.10
The outcome variable is defined as the proportional change in the economic diversity of a village,
top-coded at 4 (400% increase) to reduce the effect of outliers. We find that a new road is associated
with a positive significant increase of approximately 0.65 industries per village. Column 4 estimates
the effect of a new road on the village share of employment in informal firms, defined as those
not registered with the Indian government. We find a large increase in informality, although it
is unclear how best to interpret this result. One hypothesis is that high transportation costs keep
firms inefficiently small and informal by denying them access to larger markets. This theory would
10The 1998 Economic Census reports 3 digit NIC-1987 codes for each establishment, while the 2005 Economic
Census uses 4-digit NIC-2004 codes. We use correspondence tables published by the Ministry of Statistics and
Programme Implementation to generate a list of 217 self-contained industries, which we use as the basis of all
industry-level analysis in this paper.
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Table 3.8: Reduced form effect of rank on employment growth (placebo sample)
1 2 3 4
Pop rank (no road) 0.019 0.019
(0.033) (0.033)
Top pop (no road) 0.023 0.022
(0.045) (0.045)
Ln baseline employment -0.585 -0.585 -0.588 -0.587
(0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)***
Village pop 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.000)*** (0.003) (0.000)*** (0.003)
Village pop 2 -0.001 -0.013 -0.001 -0.012
(0.000)*** (0.026) (0.000)*** (0.026)
Village pop 3 0.041 0.038
(0.099) (0.099)
Village pop 4 -0.005 -0.005
(0.014) (0.014)
Pop growth 1991-2001 -0.059 -0.058 -0.058 -0.057
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
Irrigation share -0.130 -0.131 -0.133 -0.133
(0.055)** (0.055)** (0.055)** (0.055)**
Ln land area -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Distance from town -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Diversity (1998) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
N 2871 2871 2871 2871
r2 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. This table presents reduced form regressions using within-district population
rank as a predictor of log employment growth between 1998 and 2005 for a placebo sample of villages in
districts not receiving many PMGSY roads. All regressions weight by baseline log employment and include
state fixed effects, as well as the following village level controls: 1991-2001 population growth, share of land
irrigated, log land area, distance from nearest town and economic diversity as measured in the 1998 Economic
Census. Columns 1 and 2 define population rank as the count of in-district, in-sample villages with greater
populations, plus 1. Columns 3 and 4 use a binary variable that takes the value 1 when this rank is less than 75.
Columns 1 and 3 use quadratic population controls, while Columns 2 and 4 use quartic population controls.
Sample is comprised of villages listed as not having a paved approach road in the 2001 Population Census. We
further limit to villages in districts that constructed PMGSY roads in less than 1% of villages and villages whose
within-district population rank is less than 300. Reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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predict increased formalization in response to the construction of a new road, but if the employment
response to falling transport costs is faster than the process of formalization, we should expect to see
a short-term rise informality. Future work with the Economic Census of 2012 should enable us to
test this hypothesis.
Table 3.11 considers heterogeneity of our estimated treatment effect by village characteristics.
Theoretically, we expect that firms with better access productive inputs to grow most in response to a
fall in transportation costs. Column 1 presents the full sample estimate of the effect of a road on total
employment, while columns 2 through 7 present subsample results. We find suggestive evidence
that electricity appears to be an important complementary input to a village feeder road: while we
estimate a very small (if noisy) estimate for villages without electrical supply, we find significant,
statistically larger effects in villages with electricity supply. This result should be interpreted with
some caution, given that our identification strategy provides exogenous variation in road placement,
not in the interaction of road construction and availability of electricity. Next, we estimate effects for
villages above and below the median distance to the nearest town, which for our sample is 20 km.
We estimate a larger treatment effect for villages far from towns, although both estimates are within
one standard deviation of our full-sample estimate and are not statistically different from each other.
Likewise, we find no significant difference in our estimates when dividing our sample on human
capital, as measured by literacy.
Given the very high costs of infrastructure projects such as roads, it is of great interest to
policymakers to understand the economic impact of such projects in terms of money spent rather
than per project. The OMMS described in Section 3.5 contains data on total spending per road, which
we use to construct a village road expenditure variable that takes on the value 0 if a road is not built
in the village by 2005 and otherwise equals the sum of all PMGSY road spending in habitations
contained in that village.11 As our objective is to estimate the cost of job creation, we define our
outcome variable to be the level change in employment between 1998 and 2005, rather than log
growth as in the preceding tables. Table 3.12 presents the results of this estimation. Our estimates
range, depending on the instrument used, between approximately 500 and 700 nonfarm jobs per
million dollars spent on road construction, which results in a per job cost of between approximately
1430 and 2000 USD. Expressed differently, the per job cost of the PMGSY is roughly two to three
11We generate total road spending village in million USD, using an exchange rate of 44.06 INR per USD, the
average for 2005. In the case of roads that connect multiple habitations, spending is allocated equally between
the habitations.
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Table 3.9: IV effect of road on firm characteristics
Firm Count Firm Size Diversity Informality
New road 0.510 1.423 0.654 0.313
(0.316) (0.422)*** (0.307)** (0.110)***
Ln baseline employment
Village pop 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)**
Village pop 2 -0.012 0.016 0.009 0.008
(0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.004)*
Village pop 3 0.046 -0.056 -0.030 -0.027
(0.051) (0.062) (0.050) (0.017)
Village pop 4 -0.007 0.007 0.004 0.003
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002)
Pop growth 1991-2001 -0.109 0.111 -0.043 0.008
(0.039)*** (0.048)** (0.039) (0.013)
Irrigation share 0.095 -0.055 0.137 -0.003
(0.025)*** (0.032)* (0.025)*** (0.008)
Ln land area -0.025 -0.066 -0.026 0.002
(0.010)** (0.012)*** (0.010)** (0.003)
Distance from town -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.000)*** (0.001) (0.000)* (0.000)
Diversity (1998) 0.011 0.007 -0.081 0.002
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)***
o.Diversity (1998) 0.000
(.)
N 12073 11891 12073 12073
r2 0.32 . 0.18 0.01
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. This table presents instrumental variable regression results for which the
endogenous regressor is a dummy variable indicating the construction of a PMGSY road by 2005, instrumented
by a dummary variable indicating that within-district, within-sample population rank is less than 75. Dependent
variables for columns 1 through 4 are, respectively: count of economic establishments, mean firm size (number
of employees), proportional change in economic diversity and 2005 share of employment in informal firms. All
regressions weight by baseline log employment and include state fixed effects, as well as the following village
level controls: 1991-2001 population growth, share of land irrigated, log land area, distance from nearest town
and economic diversity as measured in the 1998 Economic Census. Sample is comprised of villages listed as
not having a paved approach road in the 2001 Population Census. We further limit to villages in districts that
constructed PMGSY roads in more than 5% of villages and villages whose within-district population rank is
less than 300. Reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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Table 3.10: IV effect of road on employment growth
1 2 3 4
New road 1.542 1.613 1.071 1.081
(0.400)*** (0.446)*** (0.356)*** (0.364)***
Ln baseline employment -0.610 -0.610 -0.609 -0.609
(0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)***
Village pop 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000)** (0.002)
Village pop 2 0.000 0.002 -0.000 -0.007
(0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.015)
Village pop 3 0.002 0.032
(0.066) (0.059)
Village pop 4 -0.001 -0.005
(0.009) (0.008)
Pop growth 1991-2001 -0.021 -0.017 -0.052 -0.052
(0.046) (0.048) (0.042) (0.043)
Irrigation share 0.078 0.078 0.087 0.087
(0.032)** (0.032)** (0.029)*** (0.029)***
Ln land area -0.054 -0.054 -0.051 -0.051
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)***
Distance from town -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001)**
Diversity (1998) 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
N 12073 12073 12073 12073
r2 . . 0.15 0.15
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. This table presents instrumental variable regression results for which the
dependent variable is log employment growth (1998-2005) and the endogenous regressor is a dummy variable
indicating the construction of a PMGSY road by 2005, instrumented by population rank. All regressions weight
by baseline log employment and include state fixed effects, as well as the following village level controls:
1991-2001 population growth, share of land irrigated, log land area, distance from nearest town and economic
diversity as measured in the 1998 Economic Census. Columns 1 and 2 define population rank as the count of
in-district, in-sample villages with greater populations, plus 1. Columns 3 and 4 use a binary variable that takes
the value 1 when this rank is less than 75. Columns 1 and 3 use quadratic population controls, while Columns 2
and 4 use quartic population controls. Sample is comprised of villages listed as not having a paved approach
road in the 2001 Population Census. We further limit to villages in districts that constructed PMGSY roads in
more than 5% of villages and villages whose within-district population rank is less than 300. Reported standard
errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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Table 3.11: IV effect of road on employment growth by village characteristics
All No Electricity Electricity Far Near Low Literacy High Literacy
New road 1.081 0.019 1.728 1.293 0.846 1.415 0.559
(0.364)*** (0.699) (0.511)*** (0.537)** (0.536) (0.493)*** (0.651)
Ln baseline employment -0.609 -0.680 -0.608 -0.628 -0.596 -0.618 -0.616
(0.013)*** (0.024)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)***
2001 Population 0.001 -0.004 0.005 -0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002)* (0.003) (0.002)** (0.003) (0.002)
2001 Population 2 -0.007 0.040 -0.042 0.027 -0.047 0.008 -0.021
(0.015) (0.044) (0.022)* (0.023) (0.020)** (0.022) (0.021)
2001 Population 3 0.032 -0.169 0.175 -0.109 0.194 -0.020 0.075
(0.059) (0.159) (0.087)** (0.089) (0.078)** (0.085) (0.081)
2001 Population 4 -0.005 0.025 -0.025 0.016 -0.028 0.002 -0.010
(0.008) (0.021) (0.012)** (0.012) (0.011)*** (0.012) (0.011)
Pop growth 1991-2001 -0.052 -0.068 0.021 0.040 -0.157 -0.109 0.028
(0.043) (0.063) (0.060) (0.064) (0.056)*** (0.058)* (0.063)
Irrigation share 0.087 0.132 0.042 0.032 0.175 0.217 -0.075
(0.029)*** (0.050)*** (0.051) (0.040) (0.043)*** (0.043)*** (0.039)*
Ln land area -0.051 -0.045 -0.046 -0.064 -0.030 -0.046 -0.036
(0.012)*** (0.018)** (0.019)** (0.016)*** (0.017)* (0.016)*** (0.022)
Distance from town -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)* (0.001) (0.001)
Diversity (1998) 0.011 0.015 0.011 0.014 0.008 0.011 0.011
(0.002)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)** (0.004)*** (0.003)***
N 12073 3106 6453 6646 5427 6886 5187
r2 0.15 0.34 . 0.08 0.22 0.05 0.26
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. This table presents instrumental variable estimates of the effect of the construction of a PMGSY road on log employment
growth (1998-2005) for different subsamples in order to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. All subsamples are defined based on 2001 Population
Census characteristics. Column 1 presents full sample results. Columns 2 and 3 are for villages with and without electricity supply, respectively. Column 4
presents results for villages with below median distance from the nearest town (20km). Column 5 presents results for villages above median distance from a
town. Column 6 presents results for villages with below median literacy, and Column 7 for villages with above-median literacy. All regressions weight by
baseline log employment and include state fixed effects, as well as the following village level controls: 1991-2001 population growth, share of land irrigated,
log land area, distance from nearest town and economic diversity as measured in the 1998 Economic Census. Sample is comprised of villages listed as not
having a paved approach road in the 2001 Population Census. We further limit to villages in districts that constructed PMGSY roads in more than 5% of
villages and villages whose within-district population rank is less than 300. Reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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times India’s GDP per capita in 2005 ($731.70). How should we interpret this result? As the Economic
Census was conducted in late 2005 and early 2006, it is safe to assume that nearly all of the roads
listed as completed by 2005 were finished by the time of data collection; thus, these results should be
understood not as temporary jobs related to road construction, but rather short- to medium-term
effects. These estimates also assume that the net employment effect of PMGSY spending in locations
not receiving roads is zero. This is a strong assumption – one we intend to investigate in future work
– as there may be either crowd-in or crowd-out of economic activity in villages and towns that are
now better connected to PMGSY villages. Finally, all estimates assume that control villages do not
receive any PMGSY road spending, an unlikely result given the multiple years that road construction
generally requires, the multiple habitations per PMGSY road project and the many roads that were
completed in 2006 and 2007. For this last reason, we consider our estimates to be likely lower bounds
on the true effect of road construction in this context.
3.7 Conclusion
Universal access to paved roads, easily taken for granted in many rich countries, is far from a reality
for many of the world’s poor. High transportation costs inhibit gains from the division of labor,
economies of scale and comparative advantage. Nevertheless, little is known of the economic effects
of road provision on rural economic activity. Theoretically, roads could facilitate migration to urban
areas and the specialization of village economies in agriculture; alternatively, lower transportation
costs could cause the emergence and expansion of rural economic activities, with potentially large
consequences for economic development, urbanization and the spatial distribution of economic
activity.
In this paper we estimate the economic impacts of a large-scale program that seeks to provide
near universal access to paved “all-weather” roads in rural India. The program design provides
two sources of exogenous variation to allow us to overcome the usual challenge of endogeneity of
large infrastructure projects. First, the program calls for highest priority to be given to habitations
above population thresholds, which may be 250, 500 or 1000 depending on the area. This creates
a discontinuity in the probability of receiving a road at these cutoffs, allowing us to use a fuzzy
regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact of these roads. A second identification strategy
takes advantage of the fact that habitations are prioritized not only by population but also by the
relative population rank within a district: a village of a certain size is more likely to receive a
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Table 3.12: IV effect of road spending on level change in employment
1 2 3 4
Road cost (million USD) 481.839 479.030 709.091 715.636
(303.054) (324.152) (333.751)** (341.696)**
Employment (EC98) -0.356 -0.356 -0.356 -0.356
(0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)***
Village pop 0.004 0.042 -0.002 0.000
(0.012) (0.145) (0.013) (0.148)
Village pop 2 0.059 -0.300 0.076 0.001
(0.034)* (1.358) (0.035)** (1.382)
Village pop 3 1.422 0.486
(5.428) (5.516)
Village pop 4 -0.199 -0.092
(0.778) (0.789)
Pop growth 1991-2001 -1.652 -1.679 -0.373 -0.339
(2.850) (2.925) (3.095) (3.134)
Irrigation share 4.674 4.661 4.815 4.845
(2.336)** (2.341)** (2.429)** (2.439)**
Ln land area -5.673 -5.673 -6.180 -6.180
(1.123)*** (1.138)*** (1.206)*** (1.201)***
Distance from town -0.093 -0.093 -0.097 -0.098
(0.042)** (0.042)** (0.044)** (0.044)**
Diversity (1998) -0.018 -0.019 0.000 0.002
(0.247) (0.248) (0.250) (0.251)
N 11833 11833 11833 11833
r2 0.08 0.08 . .
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. This table presents instrumental variable regression results for which the
dependent variable is log employment growth (1998-2005) and the endogenous regressor is the amount of
spending on a PMGSY road by 2005. For roads are not completed by 2005, this number is 0. All regressions
weight by baseline log employment and include state fixed effects, as well as the following village level controls:
1991-2001 population growth, share of land irrigated, log land area, distance from nearest town and economic
diversity as measured in the 1998 Economic Census. Columns 1 and 2 define population rank as the count of
in-district, in-sample villages with greater populations, plus 1. Columns 3 and 4 use a binary variable that takes
the value 1 when this rank is less than 75. Columns 1 and 3 use quadratic population controls, while Columns 2
and 4 use quartic population controls. Sample is comprised of villages listed as not having a paved approach
road in the 2001 Population Census. We further limit to villages in districts that constructed PMGSY roads in
more than 5% of villages and villages whose within-district population rank is less than 300. Reported standard
errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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road if there are fewer larger villages within its district than an equivalent village that has a lower
population rank. We instrument for road construction using this rank, conditioning on population,
to provide a second set of estimates of the impact of village feeder roads.
We find that the provision of a new, paved village approach road produces significantly faster
nonfarm employment growth. Rather than a simple proportional expansion of existing economic
activity, new industries form in villages that receive roads. Firm size also grows, which we take
as supporting evidence of the theory that in the presence of high transportation costs, firms are
inefficiently small. The responsiveness of nonfarm employment growth to lower transportation
costs appears to be strongest in villages that also have access to the supply of electricity, suggesting
significant complementarities between these different infrastructural investments. Finally, we provide
some of the first well-identified estimates of the cost effectiveness of rural road construction: one job
is created for every $1400 to $2000 in road construction costs, suggesting very high returns to such
investments.
Future work will allow us to further disentangle the channels by which rural roads promote
village nonfarm employment. The 2011 Population Census, not yet available at the village level, will
provide the data necessary to examine the impact of roads on migration and agricultural employment,
neither of which is covered in the Economic Census. We intend to use the 2012 Economic Census,
the collection of which is still in progress, to differentiate between the short- to medium-run effects
presented in this paper and sustained, longer-run changes to village economic activity.
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